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I. INTRODUCTION3 
This essay discusses U.S. energy policy and the associated evolution of energy 
supply, energy demand, energy prices and the industrial organization of the domestic 
energy industries during the period 1991 through 2000.  This period covers the last two 
years of the George H. W.  Bush administration and the entire Clinton administration.  It 
begins with an “energy crisis” stimulated by the invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent 
Gulf War and ends with an “energy crisis” caused by significant increases in oil and, 
especially, natural gas prices, the collapse of California’s new competitive electricity 
markets and the threat of electricity shortages throughout the Western U.S.  Both “energy 
crises” led the sitting Presidents’ administrations to develop national energy strategies 
and to try to convince Congress to enact comprehensive energy legislation to implement 
them.  Neither “energy crisis” had the severe economic impact or led to the kinds of 
dramatic, and often ill-conceived, policy responses observed following the two oil shocks 
of the 1970s.  The 1990-91 “energy crisis” was short-lived and interest in energy policy 
soon faded.  It would not be surprising if the latest “energy crisis” follows a similar 
course. 
 
Most of the decade between these two “energy crises” was characterized by 
abundant supplies of energy, stable or falling real energy prices, and relatively little 
public or political interest in national energy policy issues.   Energy demand continued to 
grow steadily through the decade, but supply was able to meet it without major increases 
in prices until the end of the decade.  Because energy prices were stable or falling during 
most of the decade and there were no serious supply disruptions, there was little interest 
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among the voters in energy policy issues and major new energy policy initiatives never 
rose very high on the policy agendas of either the Clinton administration or Congress 
during the 1990s.  After an early failed effort to get Congress to pass legislation to 
impose a large BTU tax, the Clinton administration’s energy policy initiatives became 
more modest and less urgent, largely working within the existing statutory framework 
and budget constraints.  No sweeping new energy policy legislation was passed by 
Congress after 1992 and efforts to get national electricity deregulation and regulatory 
reform legislation passed in the Administration’s final two years were not successful.   
Overall, the U.S.’s energy consumption portfolio changed very little during the decade.  
Energy demand continued to grow modestly, energy intensity continued to decline 
modestly, and the mix of fuels satisfying demand changed remarkably little.  This should 
remind us that the energy supply and consumption infrastructure changes slowly in 
response to economic forces and public policies as a consequence of sunk investments in 
long-lived assets on both the supply and demand sides.   
 
The Clinton administration’s energy policies were heavily influenced by concerns 
about the environmental impacts of energy consumption and production, including 
impacts of greenhouse gas emissions and climate change.  In particular, the 
Administration trumpeted programs to encourage renewable energy, energy efficiency, 
alternative-fuel vehicles, and increased use of natural gas in electricity generation and 
vehicles.  However, some of these efforts were hampered first by federal budgetary 
constraints which limited increased R&D expenditures and tax subsidies, then by a 
Republican Congress that restricted the administration’s efforts to tighten vehicle and 
appliance efficiency standards and provide larger tax incentives for renewable energy, 
electric fuel cell and hybrid vehicles, and finally by an unexpected acceleration in the 
pace of electricity sector restructuring and competition programs which undermined the 
administration’s efforts to use regulated monopoly utility “integrated resource planning” 
programs to subsidize energy efficiency and renewable energy.   
 
While the Clinton administration pursued federal land-use policies that further 
restricted oil and gas drilling activity on some federal lands in the West, it also quietly 
supported or acceded to Republican policy initiatives that encouraged oil and gas drilling 
in deep water in the Gulf of Mexico, tax and royalty relief for small oil and gas wells, 
opened up additional federal lands in Alaska to drilling, proceeded with the privatization 
of federal uranium enrichment facilities and the Elk Hills Naval Petroleum Reserves, 
supported federal funding for development of new technologies to increase oil extraction 
productivity, continued the slow process of licensing a federal nuclear waste storage 
facility, supported the re-licensing of operating nuclear power plants and continued 
research on advanced reactor technology, and initiated a cooperative program with the 
U.S. automobile industry to develop more fuel-efficient vehicle technology.   Foreign 
policy initiatives endeavored to strengthen relationships with the governments of oil 
producing states, to diversify the nation’s oil imports, and to foster the independence of 
oil producing states that were created after the break-up of the Soviet Union from both 
Iran and Russia.   
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An important component of energy policy during the 1990s involved the 
completion of the restructuring and deregulation of natural gas production and 
transportation begun during the 1980s, and major new initiatives to restructure the 
electric power sector so that it would rely on competitive wholesale and retail markets for 
power supplies.  The wholesale competition initiatives were undertaken initially by the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC).  The retail competition programs were  
driven primarily by state rather than federal policy initiatives.  Harmonizing diffuse state 
retail competition programs with federal wholesale market and transmission access and 
pricing reforms became a major policy challenge.  The Clinton administration supported 
these initiatives by appointing sympathetic individuals to serve as Commissioners at 
FERC and, belatedly, by proposing comprehensive federal electricity reform legislation 
in competition with numerous Republican electricity reform bills; none of which made it 
through Congress. 
 
While the 1990s was a decade of limited major new federal energy policy 
initiatives, it was also decade in which the country finally reaped the benefits of the end 
of many ill considered energy policies of the 1970s and the early 1980s:  oil and gas price 
controls, fuel-use restrictions, protectionist policies for oil refiners, publicly funded 
mega-projects to promote specific supply sources came to an end.  Traditional market 
forces were given the opportunity to operate with less government intervention in oil, 
gas, and coal markets, the restructuring of the natural gas pipeline industry was largely 
completed, and major electricity restructuring and competition initiatives began.  Even 
the controversial privatization of the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) 
reflected broad acceptance of relying primarily on market forces to govern the energy 
industries.  Moreover, the transition to competition in electricity, the spread of 
performance-based regulation, etc., provided powerful incentives to improve the 
performance of nuclear and coal-fired generating facilities.  
 
Because much of the regulatory apparatus of the 1970s and early 1980s had been 
dismantled by 1990, some of the tools for doing mischief in response to energy supply 
and price shocks were not readily available.  As a result, there was little that could be 
easily done of a regulatory nature in the short run to respond to oil price shocks in 1990-
91 and oil and gas price shocks in 2000 and 2001.  This was a good thing and made it 
easier for these sectors to adapt to changes in supply and demand conditions.  The 1990s 
benefited from the legacy of failed regulatory policies of the 1970s and 1980s in another 
important, though indirect way.  The decade began with substantial excess capacity and a 
variety of inefficiencies on the supply side.  They provided significant opportunities for 
cost reduction and innovation in energy production and distribution.  This too contributed 
to abundant supplies, stable or falling prices, and allowed energy policy issues to fade 
into the background on the national policy agenda.  The legacy of regulatory and energy 
policies of the 1970s and 1980s also were a major stimulus for electricity restructuring 
initiatives in California and the Northeast which had inherited high-cost assets and 
contracts from the 1970s and 1980s whose costs for regulatory purposes were often far 
above their 1990s competitive market values.   
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The Clinton administration embraced and supported increased reliance on market 
forces to allocate energy resources and continued efforts begun by the previous 
administration to remove barriers to good market performance.  The Clinton 
administration viewed the proper role of energy policy to be to respond to market 
imperfections, especially as they related to the environmental impacts of energy 
production and consumption.  However, the favorable performance of the energy sectors 
during most of the 1990s also led to some complacency on the energy policy front, 
especially regarding investments in energy supply infrastructure.  While the decade began 
with substantial excess capacity in electricity generation and transmission, natural gas 
production and transportation, and oil refining capacity, the capacity of these 
infrastructure facilities were being stressed by the end of the decade.  Tight supplies and 
growing demand led to rising prices for oil, natural gas, and wholesale electricity by the 
end of the decade, to significant energy price volatility.  Regulatory and environmental 
constraints, as well as continued uncertainty about the future of electricity sector 
restructuring, contributed to tight supplies, price volatility and some spot shortages of 
electricity and natural gas during 2000 and 2001.   
   
The essay proceeds in the following way.  First, I will discuss a number of  
reasons why the United States might need a set of sustained national policies specific to 
the energy sector.  Next, I will provide a background discussion of energy supply, 
consumption and energy policy prior to the 1990s.  I then turn to an overview of the 
evolution of energy markets and energy policy during the 1990s.  This discussion is 
followed by a more detailed discussion of supply, demand and public policies affecting 
the primary sources of energy during the 1990s: petroleum, natural gas, electricity, coal, 
nuclear energy, renewable energy and energy efficiency.  The essay concludes with some 
reflections about current energy policy challenges.   
 
II.   WHY DO WE NEED NATIONAL ENERGY POLICIES? 
It is useful to begin with a brief discussion of the reasons why we might need 
national policies targeted specifically at energy supply, demand, and pricing that go 
beyond broader public policies (tax, antitrust, environmental, R&D, etc.) affecting 
American industry generally.  Energy policies are derivative policies reflecting a number 
of higher level policy objectives and considerations.4 
 
a. Important infrastructure sectors essential for economic growth and 
development:  Economical and reliable supplies of energy play an important 
role in fostering economic growth and development.  Energy, like 
transportation and telecommunications services, is a key intermediate input 
into most sectors of a developed economy.  Distortions in prices, 
consumption, supply, or reliability of energy infrastructure services can lead 
to large economic and social costs.  Moreover, because the short run demand 
for energy tends to be quite inelastic and dependent on long-lived capital 
                                                 
4 The list is not meant to be exhaustive.  Clearly, income distribution concerns have played a role in energy 
policy formation and implementation.  So too have market imperfections which may make it difficult for 
consumers to make rational investments in energy-using structures, equipment and appliances. 
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investments, it takes time for consumers to respond fully to long term shifts in 
price levels by changing consumption patterns.  Key segments of the energy 
system (electricity and natural gas networks) have (or had) natural monopoly 
characteristics and have been subject to economic regulation for most of this 
century.  The performance of these regulatory institutions has profound 
implications for broader indices of economic performance.   
 
b. National Security Concerns:  A growing fraction of U.S. energy consumption 
is supplied by imports of energy, primarily petroleum, from other countries.  
World petroleum reserves in countries exporting oil are concentrated in the 
North Africa, the Persian Gulf, Russia, and countries that were formerly part 
of the Soviet Union.5  These regions are politically unstable and have 
governments that are not always friendly to the United States.  Because 
energy, and in particular petroleum, is an important input supporting 
economic growth and development, energy market instability is potentially 
very costly to the U.S. economy and those of our oil-importing allies.  
Accordingly, enemies of the United States or its allies may use energy supply 
strategically in an effort to influence other U.S. policies.6   
 
c. Environmental Impacts:  The combustion of fossil fuels is the primary source 
of air pollution targeted by environmental policies aimed at cleaning the air 
(NOx, SO2, CO, etc.) and accounts for most of the production of CO2, a 
greenhouse gas generally thought to be a major contributor to global climate 
change. Energy production and delivery also have significant potential 
impacts on water quality, water temperature, and land use.  Since air and 
water pollution are generally acknowledged to be “externalities” which 
require policy intervention, environmental policies will have significant 
effects on energy supply, demand and prices and vice versa.  Environmental 
policies necessarily affect energy markets and energy policies necessarily 
have environmental effects.  Sensible environmental policy should be matched 
with compatible energy policies.  Moreover, because the U.S. has been 
reluctant to use the best available instruments to internalize environmental 
externalities (e.g. environmental taxes and/or property rights-based cap and 
trade systems), second (third, fourth or more) best policies may involve 
interventions that work directly on the supply of and demand for the resources  
that have adverse environmental impacts. 
 
d. Competition Policy:  General U.S. economic policy is oriented toward 
promoting the development of competitive markets and relying on price and 
entry regulation only when unregulated markets have “natural monopoly” 
characteristics and are expected to perform poorly absent regulation.  
Important segments of the U.S. energy sector, in particular electric power and 
                                                 
5 Countries in the Middle East and North Africa account for over 70% of world crude oil reserves. 
 
6 This is not my area of expertise, but it seems to me that the oil import situation for both the U.S. and other 
G8 countries in the aggregate is an important consideration in evaluating energy security issues.  
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natural gas, have been subject to price and entry regulation for almost a 
century.  As already noted, these regulatory institutions have important 
implications for the performance of these important infrastructure sectors and, 
therefore, for the performance of the economy.  U.S. competition policies 
continually reexamine the rationale for and performance of price and entry 
regulation.  Poor sector performance, as well as technological and economic 
changes that undermine the case for price and entry regulation, can make it 
desirable to design and implement competition policies that restructure 
regulated industries to expand opportunities for competition and shrink the 
expanse of price and entry regulation.  Competition (antitrust) policies have 
not only served as constant pressures on regulated energy industries, but have 
also played an important role in affecting the structure and behavior of 
generally “unregulated” energy segments, especially the petroleum sector.  
However, U.S. antitrust policy alone cannot fully override existing state and 
federal statutes that create regulated monopoly sectors.  Specific changes in 
state and federal legislation are necessary to do so. 
 
e. Use of Publicly-owned Resources:  A significant fraction of domestic energy 
resources lie on or under land that is controlled by the federal government 
(and to a lesser extent state governments) and this fraction has been 
increasing.7   Hydroelectric resources lie on rivers and in locations subject to 
state or federal jurisdiction. The federal government has no choice but to 
develop and implement policies which define how these lands can be used for 
energy exploration and production.  Whether and how these public lands are 
made available for exploration, development and production of energy can 
have important implications for energy supply and prices.  These policies also 
have impacts on the environment that further complicate the interactions 
between energy and environmental policies.    Sound federal land use policies 
cannot be developed independent of complementary energy and 
environmental policies.  
 
f. Federalism Issues:  Responsibility for energy policy involves both the states 
and the federal government.  However, state energy policy decisions can have 
impacts on other states and on suppliers of energy and energy-using 
equipment that affect consumers in many states.  Conflicts between state 
policies have emerged in electricity and natural gas industry reform initiatives.  
Moreover, individual uncoordinated state programs defining appliance 
efficiency standards, air and water emissions standards, the composition of 
gasoline, certification of energy facilities, etc., can increase the overall 
national costs of achieving energy policy and environmental goals.  Federal 
policies may be necessary to harmonize state programs to reduce their costs 
and to alleviate barriers to interstate commerce created by individual state 
policies. 
                                                 
7 Due largely to increased production from Federal offshore tracts, the share of domestic oil production 
from Federal lands increased from 16.3% in 1989 to 26.9% in 1997; similarly, the federal share of natural 
gas production increased from 30.2% in 1980 to 39.3% in 1997. 
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III.  BACKGROUND:  ENERGY SUPPLY AND DEMAND AND ENERGY  
        POLICY BEFORE 1990 
Historically, energy has been abundant and relatively inexpensive in the U.S.     
Americans consume roughly 70% more energy per capita or per dollar of GDP than do 
people in most other developed countries. [FIGURE 1]  We drive bigger cars, drive them 
further, live in bigger houses, and heat, cool and light them more, and work in buildings 
that use substantially more energy per square meter than Europeans.  The availability of 
reliable supplies of cheap energy, especially gasoline, is viewed as a birthright by many 
Americans.  Taxes on energy are much lower in the U.S. than in most other developed 
countries and most politicians have learned that proposing large increases in energy taxes 
is unlikely to be a career-enhancing decision.  Accordingly, consumer prices for all forms 
of energy in the U.S. are relatively low compared to Western Europe and Japan.  
Nevertheless, last year Americans spent (directly or indirectly) about $600 billion on 
energy of all kinds.  About 38% of U.S. energy consumption comes from petroleum, 24% 
from natural gas, 23% from coal, 8% from nuclear power, and 7% from renewable 
energy, primarily conventional hydroelectric resources.8  This mix is little changed from 
1990. [FIGURE 2 and FIGURE 3].  Residential energy consumption in 2000 accounted 
for 20%, commercial 17%, industrial 36%, and transportation 27% of energy consumed 
in 2000.  The 2000 sector mix is almost identical to that in 1990 as well. [FIGURE 4 and 
FIGURE 5]  
 
The U.S. has been blessed with large endowments of domestic energy resources --
- petroleum, natural gas, coal, and hydroelectric resources. These endowments are not 
equally divided among the states, however.  Most of the states along the Atlantic and 
Pacific Oceans have relatively limited fossil fuel resources and are very significant net 
importers of energy.  There are substantial coal resources distributed throughout the 
Appalachian mountain region in Western Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Kentucky and 
stretching west into Tennessee, Indiana and Illinois.  There are also very substantial coal 
resources in the far West, especially in Wyoming, Montana, New Mexico, Utah and 
Arizona.  Oil and natural gas production resources are concentrated in Texas, Louisiana, 
Alaska, Oklahoma, and several western states, including California.  Hydroelectric 
resources are concentrated in the West. 
 
Historically, the U.S. relied relatively little on imports of energy from other 
countries, though imports of petroleum began to increase rapidly in the early 1970s and, 
have increase steadily since 1985 to the point where we now import about 60% of our 
petroleum is imported from countries around the world.9  [FIGURE 6 and FIGURE 7]  
                                                 
8 This includes primary fuels used to produce electricity. 
 
9 OPEC countries accounted for 43% of world oil production and 51% of world oil production outside of 
North America in 2000.  The comparable figures for 1990 are 38% and 47%.  In 1973, however, OPEC 
accounted for 56% of world oil production and 69% of production outside of North America. 
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Many analysts expect U.S. petroleum imports to continue to grow as a fraction of total 
U.S. petroleum consumption; up to 75% by 2020.10  
 
Prior to the first oil shock in 1973-74, federal energy policy consisted primarily of 
uncoordinated industry specific support policies:  various tax subsidies for oil and natural 
gas production, the leasing of federal lands for oil and natural gas exploration and 
production, quotas on imported oil to protect domestic suppliers from cheap imports, 
substantial research and development expenditures devoted to promoting the production 
of electricity using nuclear power --- a legacy of the development of nuclear weapons 
during WW II ---, the regulation of the prices charged for transportation by interstate 
natural gas pipelines and, beginning in the early 1960s, a complex system of price 
controls on natural gas sold in interstate commerce.  The states were primarily 
responsible for regulating prices for electricity and the local distribution of natural gas 
since these services were provided by state-franchised monopolies.  State agencies in 
Texas, Louisiana and a few other states also played an important role in regulating 
supplies of oil and natural gas.  
 
In the last 30 years, there have been several bursts of political activity 
(characterized as responding to an “energy crisis”) focused on developing national 
policies to increase domestic production of energy and to increase the efficiency with 
which energy is used in the U.S. in order to reduce the rate of growth in energy 
consumption in general and the growth in oil imports in particular.  These initiatives have 
generally been stimulated by some kind of energy supply and price “shock,” and 
associated concerns about energy security and U.S. dependence on imported oil, and the 
associated impacts on the U.S. economy.  After the first oil price shock in 1973-74, 
President Nixon launched Project Independence, with the goal of achieving U.S. energy-
self-sufficiency by 1980.  These initiatives included reorganizations of federal agencies 
involved in energy research and development, new energy price regulations, data 
collection and policy initiatives.  In 1975, President Ford signed the Energy Policy and 
Conservation Act, extending price controls on oil, establishing automobile fuel efficiency 
standards, and authorizing the creation of a Strategic Petroleum Reserve.   
 
Almost immediately after becoming President, Jimmy Carter signed the 
Emergency Natural Gas Act of 1977 in response to growing natural gas shortages 
resulting from the existing price controls on natural gas supplies sold in interstate 
commerce.  Soon after, President Carter announced a National Energy Plan and called for 
the creation of a new Department of Energy (DOE, created later that year) to consolidate 
dispersed federal agencies involved in energy policy, research, and development 
                                                 
10For example, see Annual Energy Outlook 2001, Energy Information Administration, December 2000, 
page 88.  The U.S. consumes roughly 19 million barrels of oil per day (including natural gas liquids), of 
which about 11 million barrels per day is imported.  Domestic consumption grew steadily during the 1990s 
while domestic production fell steadily (more on this below).  To put this in perspective, if ANWR is 
developed it is projected to produce about 600,000 barrels of oil per day. If growing petroleum imports is 
perceived to be a policy problem it is extremely unlikely that increases in domestic petroleum supplies will 
have a significant impact on petroleum import trends. 
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programs.11  After a contentious political debate lasting more than a year, in late 1978 
Congress passed and President Carter signed the National Energy Act, which included 
the National Energy Policy and Conservation Act (NEPCA), the Power Plant and 
Industrial Fuel Use Act (FUA), the Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA), the 
Energy Tax Act (ETA), and the Natural Gas Policy Act (NGPA).  NEPCA provided that 
the DOE was to issue appliance efficiency standards for household appliances and 
charged the FTC with issuing appliance energy efficiency labeling rules.  PURPA 
required states to determine whether they should and would introduce new pricing 
mechanisms to encourage energy conservation and obligated electric utilities to purchase 
power from cogeneration plants and small power production facilities using renewable 
and waste fuels.  The NGPA, began the deregulation of “new gas” supplies while 
continuing price regulation of “old gas” supplies.  The ETA provided tax breaks for 
domestic energy supplies and energy efficiency improvements.  The Fuel Use Act 
prohibited the use of natural gas and oil, whose prices were kept below market clearing 
levels by federal price controls, in new power plants and phased out natural gas use in 
existing power plants by 1990.  These regulations reflected an effort to alleviate natural 
gas shortages and reduce the demand for oil burned “inefficiently” to generate electricity.  
These regulations pushed utilities to increase their use of coal to generate electricity. 
 
Only two months after President Carter signed the laws making up the National 
Energy Act, Iran ceased exporting oil following the Shah’s overthrow, leading to 
worldwide shortages of oil and an explosion in world oil prices.  In March 1979, a serious 
accident occurred at the Three Mile Island (TMI) nuclear power plant in Pennsylvania, 
reinforcing already significant opposition to nuclear power, leading to a moratorium on 
the completion of new nuclear plants, and a temporary closure of some operating nuclear 
plants, pending a review of safety issues raised by the TMI accident.  In April 1979, 
President Carter, responding to growing oil and gas shortages, announced the gradual 
decontrol of oil prices and proposed a windfall profits tax on producers.  In July, he 
proclaimed a national energy supply shortage, established temperature restrictions in non-
residential buildings, and went on television to address the nation to argue that energy 
shortages had become a major test for the nation requiring sacrifices of various kinds.  He 
also announced an $88 billion program to produce synthetic fuels from domestic coal and 
shale oil reserves and a few months later announced proposals to increase domestic 
energy supplies and reduce consumption.  In June, 1980 President Carter signed the 
Energy Security Act, consisting of six pieces of legislation: U.S. Synthetic Fuels 
Corporation Act, Biomass Energy and Alcohol Fuels Act, Renewable Energy Resources 
Act, Solar Energy and Energy Conservation Act, Geothermal Energy Act, and Ocean 
Thermal Energy Conversion Act.  These laws all provided an array of tax subsidies and 
direct subsidies for alternative energy supplies and to encourage energy efficiency.  The 
synthetic fuel and shale oil programs were later abandoned as oil and natural gas prices 
fell during the 1980s. 
 
                                                 
11 The DOE also has extensive responsibilities for the U.S. nuclear weapons program and for the cleanup of 
weapons research and production sites.  I will not discuss these aspects of the DOE’s activities in this 
essay. 
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Oil prices peaked in 1981, fell gradually until 1985 and then fell dramatically in 
1986. [FIGURE 8] Real oil prices have stayed far below their 1981-85 peak since then.  
Natural gas prices peaked in 1982-84 and then fell dramatically after 1984. [FIGURE 
18] During the 1990s real natural gas prices fluctuated between $1.50 and $2.50/MCF 
until May 2000 when they began to increase rapidly, reaching a new post-1973 peak by 
the end of 2000, before falling back to about $3/MCF in late July 2001.  Real coal prices 
began to fall in the late 1970s and real electricity prices fell during the post-1985 period.  
As energy prices fell and the supply shortages disappeared, interest in energy policy 
seems to have quickly declined as well.  There were few significant new federal energy 
policy initiatives during the Reagan administration or the first years of the George H. W. 
Bush administration.  Presidents Reagan and Bush largely completed the process of 
deregulating oil and natural gas commodity prices.  The Natural Gas Wellhead Decontrol 
Act of 1989 completely removed the wildly inefficient price controls on wellhead prices 
of natural gas effective January 1993.   
 
Historically, local gas distribution utilities (LDCs), electric utilities and large 
industrial consumers of natural gas purchased their gas needs from interstate pipeline 
companies under long-term contracts. (Smaller consumers in turn purchased gas from 
LDCs at prices regulated by state regulatory agencies)  These supply contracts “bundled” 
the supply of natural gas itself with the transportation of that gas.  The associated prices 
charged by interstate pipeline companies were subject to regulation by the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) using cost-of-service principles.12  The pipelines 
in turn entered into long term gas supply contracts with gas producers.13  In 1985, FERC 
began an initiative to open up access to interstate natural gas pipelines to allow gas 
distribution companies, electric utilities, and large industrial consumers to purchase gas 
separately from transportation service, allowing them to contract directly with gas 
producers or marketing intermediaries, purchasing transportation service from interstate 
pipelines separately from the gas itself.  This initiative was a response to the changing 
market and regulatory framework governing the production of natural gas.  As field 
prices of natural gas declined and supplies increased during the 1980s, pipelines and gas 
distribution companies found themselves locked into long-term contracts at very high 
prices.  This created enormous incentives for industrial customers to seek ways to bypass 
high regulated pipeline and gas distribution tariff prices to get at low-priced gas in the 
field by buying directly from producers and using competing pipelines (including 
constructing spur lines to get to them) to transport market-priced natural gas.  Legislation 
that went into effect in 1979 created limited opportunities for pipelines to make special 
arrangements with industrial customers to increase sales of natural gas by offering them 
transportation service at regulated prices, but allowing them to purchase gas at lower 
unregulated prices.  As field prices fell, the demand for these special arrangements grew, 
resulting in enormous differences in purchase prices depending on the ability particular 
                                                 
12 S. Breyer and P. MacAvoy, Energy Regulation by the Federal Power Commission, Brookings Institution, 
1974, Washington, D.C. 
 
13 FERC (under its previous name, the Federal Power Commission) began regulating field prices of natural 
gas, in addition to pipeline charges, in the early 1960s.  Field price controls were not fully removed until 
1993, though they were largely eliminated during the 1980s. 
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buyers had to make special supply arrangements with pipelines.  The growing bypass 
efforts threatened to create serious “stranded cost” problems for pipelines and LDCs 
locked into long-term contracts.   
 
In 1985, FERC issued Order 436 which established a voluntary program to 
encourage pipelines to provide “open access” transportation service in order to allow 
natural gas producers to negotiate directly with local gas distribution utilities, electric 
utilities and large industrial consumers of natural gas supplies.  This was an effort to 
rationalize a regulatory framework that was rapidly collapsing and to do so in a way that 
was fair to customers, pipelines and LDCs.  Gas transportation rates would continue to be 
regulated by FERC, but the price of commodity natural gas would be determined through 
arms-length negotiations. This order began the separation of interstate pipelines’ 
transportation functions from their “merchant” functions as marketers of natural gas.  
Although Order 436’s open access rules were voluntary, the order provided financial 
incentives for pipelines to adopt the open access rules and associated separations of 
transportation and merchant functions in order to obtain recovery of above-market “take-
or-pay” contract costs.  Along with the deregulation of wellhead prices for natural gas, 
these regulations spurred the development of competitive markets for natural gas at a 
growing number of trading hubs, markets for gas storage, secondary markets for pipeline 
capacity, the development of a vibrant gas marketing industry, and the creation of 
financial derivatives markets giving wholesale gas consumers a wide range of contracting 
and risk management options.  These developments later served as the model FERC 
relied upon to foster competitive wholesale electricity markets and access to the 
transmission capacity necessary to support them.  
 
 Federal policy toward nuclear power during the 1980s was primarily a policy of 
benign neglect.  Legislation was passed in 1982 and 1987 to identify and develop a site 
for storing waste fuel from civilian nuclear reactors, though the future of nuclear power 
continued to dim as costs escalated, electricity demand growth slowed and many 
announced nuclear plants were cancelled.  Federal funding for the development of the 
Clinch River Breeder Reactor was terminated in 1983 and the project cancelled.  Federal 
budget cuts reduced DOE spending on research and development dramatically during the 
1980s.  The Reagan administration opposed setting appliance efficiency standards 
required by legislation passed during the Carter administration and eventually 
promulgated “no-standard standards.”  The DOE was then sued for failing to enforce the 
National Energy and Conservation Act of 1978 and a Court of Appeals ruled against the 
Reagan administration.  However, little progress was made in enacting federal appliance 
efficiency standards until the late 1980s, when new federal legislation was passed in 
response to a growing number of states enacting their own appliance efficiency standards 
and manufacturer concerns about the prospect of manufacturing appliances meeting 
numerous state-specific energy efficiency standards. 
 
During the 1980s, the states became much more involved in energy policy, largely 
stimulated by Title II of the Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA) and the 
Reagan administration’s perceived indifference to energy policy and environmental 
issues.  Title II of PURPA required electric utilities to purchase electricity supplied by 
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“Qualifying Facilities” (QF) producing electricity using cogeneration technology, 
renewable and waste fuels.14  The objective of PURPA was to stimulate electricity 
production from more thermally efficient cogeneration plants and to encourage the use of 
renewable and waste fuels in the production of electricity, combining energy security 
goals with environmental protection goals.  The details of implementation, however, were 
left to the states.  The states were required to develop regulations to ensure that electric 
utilities would stand ready to purchase power from QFs at prices reflecting their “full 
avoided costs.”  Several states, including California, New York, all of the New England 
states, New Jersey and Pennsylvania embraced PURPA with great enthusiasm.  In 
addition to requiring utilities to pay high prices for QF power under 20 to 30 year 
contracts, the implementation of PURPA was also accompanied by the creation of public 
“integrated resource planning” (IRP) or “least cost planning” (LCP) processes to 
determine “appropriate” electric utility investment and contracting strategies which were 
eventually implemented with competitive bidding programs.  These programs were 
heavily influenced by environmental groups active in these states (NRDC, EDF, CLF).  
The programs required treating “customer energy efficiency investments and other 
demand-side programs” as utility “resources” and led to the creation in some states of 
large utility programs to subsidize customer energy efficiency investments.  The rationale 
for and economic consequences of these programs were controversial.15  The costs of 
these subsidies, in turn, were funded through higher regulated electricity prices.  These 
states (California, New York, Massachusetts, Maine, Washington and a few others) led 
the development of an increasingly close linkage between energy policy and 
environmental policy.  As I will discuss presently, many of these states were also the 
pioneers in electricity sector restructuring and competition in the mid-1990s, stimulated 
in part by the high costs and high electricity prices resulting from the PURPA initiatives 
of the 1980s. 
 
States also began to enact their own appliance efficiency standards.  California 
imposed appliance efficiency standards during 1977-79 and upgraded these standards 
during the 1980s.  Other states followed California’s lead during the 1980s, including 
New York, Florida, Massachusetts, and Connecticut.  The proliferation of different 
individual state standards then led appliance manufacturers to seek uniform national 
appliance efficiency standards.  Manufacturers and energy efficiency advocates 
(environmental groups) negotiated what became the National Appliance Energy 
Conservation Act in 1987.  This Act contains specific efficiency standards for 12 types of 
home appliances that are supposed to be updated from time to time by the DOE.  The first 
standards became effective in 1988 and 1990 and the DOE has revised the statutory 
standards since then.  President Clinton approved new standards for air conditioners and 
other appliances close to the end of his term. 
                                                 
14 A more detailed discussion can be found in P. Joskow, "Regulatory Failure, Regulatory Reform and 
Structural Change In The Electric Power Industry", Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: 
Microeconomics, 1989 and the references cited there. 
 
15 See for example P. Joskow and D. Marron, "What Does a Negawatt Really Cost? Evidence From Electric 
Utility Conservation Programs", The Energy Journal, 1992  and J. Eto, et. al , “Where Did the Money Go? 
The Cost and Performance of the Largest Commercial Sector DSM Programs,” The Energy Journal, Vol. 
21, No. 1, 2000. 
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  Most of the federal energy policy initiatives during the 1970s and 1980s were 
portrayed largely as responses to “energy and economic security” concerns associated 
with excessive dependence on foreign oil, and followed sudden large increases in 
petroleum prices and temporary oil and gas shortages.  As time went on, however, energy 
policy and environmental policy initiatives became more closely linked as well since 
fossil fuel combustion accounts for a large fraction of the emissions of most air pollutants 
(NOx, SO2, CO, lead) and carbon dioxide.  Energy efficiency and renewable energy 
slowly rose to more prominent places on the policy agenda.  As I will discuss, this 
linkage became much closer at the federal level with the enactment of the Energy Policy 
Act of 1992 (EPAct92) at the end of the George H. W. Bush administration and this 
linkage was strengthened during the Clinton administration.  State governments have also 
played an increasing role in influencing energy policy, largely reflecting the influence of 
environmental groups in California and the Northeast.   
 
IV. ENERGY POLICY OVERVIEW:  1990 THROUGH 2000 
A. Energy Policy 1990-1992 
The decade began with the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, the curtailment of oil 
exports from the area, and a rapid and significant run-up in oil prices in mid- 1990.  This 
in turn led to the now familiar, though episodic, process of hand ringing by politicians 
and the media about rising oil prices, dependence on Middle East oil, and the absence of 
any sustained coherent U.S. energy policy.  The Department of Energy developed a 
“national energy strategy” which presented policy options to President George H.W. 
Bush.16  In February 1991, the Bush administration proposed federal energy policy 
legislation to Congress. It focused on increasing oil, natural gas, and nuclear power 
production, including oil and gas exploration in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge 
(ANWR).  The proposals were very controversial and aggressively opposed by 
Democrats and environmentalists.  Congress spent the rest of the year debating the 
administration’s proposed energy policy measures.  The core features of the Bush 
administration’s bill were finally rejected by the Congress in June 1991.   
 
The debate about energy policy continued in 1992, though the public concern 
about high oil prices, potential shortages and dependence on imported oil faded quickly 
away with the end (so to speak) of the Gulf War.  Indeed, in retrospect, the oil shock of 
1990-91 was much more modest, narrower and short-lived than the previous two oil 
shocks and it is surprising that it generated so much media attention and legislative 
activity.  Apparently, energy “supply-siders” saw this as an opportunity to promote their 
favorite policy initiatives.  They may have regretted doing so.  The debate subsequently  
shifted away from the Bush administration’s supply-side initiatives to a very different 
energy policy program advocated by House Democrats.  The Energy Policy Act of 1992 
(EPAct92) was passed in October 1992.  It was the only piece of major energy policy 
                                                 
16 There was a big increase in media coverage of energy policy issues during this period.  A Herb Block 
cartoon (August 12, 1990) depicted the White House staff searching for an energy policy, which was last 
heard of during the Jimmy Carter administration.  Numerous editorials in major newspapers during the rest 
of 1990 called for a national energy policy. 
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legislation passed during the 1990s.  It grew out of legislation proposed by Congressman 
Phil Sharp entitled “The National Energy Efficiency Act of 1991.”  It was a very different 
piece of energy legislation than the Bush administration had proposed in 1991.  Rather 
than being a supply-side program oriented toward conventional fuels it focused on 
creating tax and direct subsidies for energy efficiency and renewable energy technologies 
and on encouraging all states to develop and implement “integrated resource planning” 
programs for their utilities which were to include utility-sponsored energy efficiency 
programs in their resources planning processes.   The associated costs were to be 
included to regulated retail electricity and gas prices.   
 
EPAct92 also made changes in the Federal Power Act (FPA) and the Public 
Utility Holding Company Act (PUHCA) that helped to make electricity industry 
restructuring and competition initiatives feasible. Ironically, these restructuring and 
competition programs in turn eventually undermined the state integrated resource 
planning and energy efficiency programs which EPAct92 promoted since their structure 
and financing relied heavily on the institution of regulated monopoly to support what 
were effectively a set of “taxation by regulation” policies.17 
 
   In 1992, FERC also issued Order 636, the culmination of nearly a decade of 
policy initiatives to open up access to natural gas pipelines by unbundling the sale of 
transportation service, the sale of gas storage services, and the sale of natural gas itself, 
allowing buyers and sellers of “commodity” natural gas to negotiate supply contracts 
directly and then to buy pipeline transportation service to deliver the gas from field to 
destination.  Order 636 supported continued development of competitive natural gas 
markets, natural gas marketing, natural gas financial derivatives markets, natural gas 
storage, and secondary markets for natural gas pipeline capacity.  It represented the 
culmination of eight years of efforts by FERC to respond to the consequences if the 
natural gas regulatory policies of the 1970s and early 1980s and the subsequent collapse 
of the existing regulatory and contractual framework governing the natural gas industry.  
As FERC continued to restructure the pipeline industry, states began to extend the 
“unbundling” concept to Local Gas Distribution Companies (LDCs), allowing industrial 
and larger commercial consumers to purchase unbundled transportation service from their 
LDC as well.  These state policies further expanded the base of retail customers 
purchasing in competitive gas commodity markets and working with gas marketers and 
brokers.  These developments have important implications for related changes in the 
electric power industry that came later in the decade. 
 
EPAct92 was the only major piece of energy policy legislation enacted during the 
1990s.  Moreover, it was largely a Democratic energy policy framework inherited by the 
Clinton administration soon after it was signed by President George W. Bush and was the 
                                                 
17 See Paul L. Joskow “Emerging Conflicts Between Competition, Conservation, and Environmental 
Policies in the Electric Power Industry,” prepared for the California Foundation on the Environment and the 
Economy conference on the regulatory compact, April 2-3, 1992. Expenditures on electric utility energy 
efficiency and demand side management programs peaked in 1994 and have declined significantly since then.  
See Annual Energy Review 1999, Energy Information Administration, July 2000, page 228.    
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foundation for much of the Administration’s subsequent energy policy efforts.  
Accordingly, it is useful to summarize its primary provisions. 
 
a. Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy: Directs the Secretary of Energy to 
establish energy efficiency standards for federal buildings, to develop voluntary 
energy efficiency standards for residential and commercial buildings and to 
incorporate them in state building codes; Directs the Secretary of HUD to 
establish an energy efficient mortgage financing program in five states, to develop 
an affordable housing plan using energy efficient mortgage financing incentives; 
Specifies parameters and provides funding for R&D on cost effective 
technologies to improve energy efficiency and increase renewable energy use in 
buildings; Amends PURPA to require gas and electric utilities to employ 
integrated resource planning and to adjust prices to encourage energy efficient 
decisions by consumers and to provide grants to states for DSM programs; 
Amends EPCA to include energy efficiency labeling for commercial and 
industrial equipment, to define energy efficiency standards for a specified set of 
such equipment, to define guidelines for energy efficiency audits and insulation in 
industrial facilities, to provide grants for efficiency improvements in low-income 
housing;  Establishes various programs to encourage/require improvements in 
energy efficiency in federal buildings; Requires the Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) to collect data on renewable energy production and 
demand-side management programs; Creates tax subsidies to encourage energy 
efficiency and alternative fuels, including electric vehicles, solar and geothermal 
energy production, alcohol fuels (thank you Senator Dole!), and (snuck it in) 
independent oil and gas producers; Establishes a program and authorizes funding 
for further commercialization of renewable energy technologies, requires various 
studies and reports on renewable energy and data collection regarding renewable 
energy and its impacts on reducing greenhouse gas emissions. 
 
b. Alternative fueled Vehicles:  Provides for acquisition of alternative fueled 
vehicles for the federal fleet, subsidies for an alternative fuels commercial truck 
program and mass transit, funding for an electric motor vehicle demonstration 
program and electric motor vehicle refueling infrastructure, various low-interest 
financing and subsidy programs for alternative fuel vehicles. 
 
c. Electricity Generation and Use:  In addition to above, establishes an R&D 
program for various specified technologies for the generation of electricity from 
renewables on-grid and off-grid, fuel cells, heat engines, superconductors and 
other technologies. 
 
d. Coal: Authorizes R&D expenditure for specified coal-based technologies, to 
solicit additional proposals for clean-coal technology, and for technology transfer. 
 
e. Strategic Petroleum Reserve:  Provides for an increase in the size of the SPR to 1 
billion barrels and expands the set of circumstances in which a severe supply 
disruption is deemed to exist. 
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f. Global Climate Change: Requires various reports, studies and assessments 
regarding global climate change and options for reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions.   
 
g. Nuclear Energy:  Directs the DOE to perform various studies, to develop 
emissions criteria, and oversight of the Yucca Mountain nuclear waste fuel 
depository site; Creates the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) as a 
government corporation to take over ownership and responsibility for the federal 
government’s uranium enrichments plants and requires the USEC to transmit to 
the President and Congress a strategic plan for privatizing the Corporation;  
Requires the USEC to purchase uranium from domestic suppliers, to “overfeed” it 
into the uranium enrichment process (i.e. to artificially increase the demand for 
domestic uranium), and to create a strategic uranium reserve.  Provides funds for 
R&D on advanced nuclear technologies. 
 
h. Electric Utility Restructuring and Competition:  Amends the Federal Power Act to 
give FERC authority to order utilities to provide interstate transmission service 
(“wheeling”) to any jurisdictional supplier requesting such service, requires that 
the costs of providing such service be recovered from those requesting service, 
and expands transmission service obligations to the Bonneville Power Authority 
and to those  portions of Texas (ERCOT) which had previously been exempt from 
the FPA by virtue of their decision not to interconnect with either the Eastern or 
Western Interconnections (keeping Texas electrons out of interstate commerce);  
Amends the Public Utility Holding Company Act (PUHCA) to exempt 
independent power producers meeting certain criteria (Exempt Wholesale 
Generators --- EWG) from most of the provisions of PUHCA;  Amends PUHCA 
to exempt foreign utility holding companies from certain provisions of the Act 
and to allow U.S. utility holding companies to own interests in foreign utilities. 
 
 
B. Energy Policy 1993-2000 
The focus of EPAct92 on energy efficiency, renewable energy, and environmental 
impact mitigation was well matched to the positions that the Clinton-Gore team had 
advanced during their election campaign.  Vice President Gore was a champion of 
environmental improvement and had expressed deep concerns about CO2 emissions and 
their impacts on global climate change.  Their appointments to the Department of Energy 
were consistent with these views.  Secretary Hazel O’Leary drew together an energy 
policy team that was very “green” and had been closely involved with the development of 
integrated resource planning, renewable energy, and demand-side management programs 
in their respective states.18  This team saw the opportunity to bring the lessons they had 
learned in New England, New York, and California about the wonders of using electric 
                                                 
18 A large fraction of the DOE budget is devoted to nuclear weapons-related programs and the clean-up of 
radioactive waste on sites associated with these programs.  I will not discuss these important aspects of 
DOE activities in this paper. 
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and gas utilities as instruments for promoting energy efficiency, renewable energy, and 
related programs to the rest of the country.  Promoting improvements in energy 
efficiency, renewable energy, alternative-fuel vehicles and new technologies for 
extracting and using conventional energy sources were their highest priorities.   
 
Soon after his inauguration, President Clinton proposed the implementation of a 
large broad based tax on energy (the “btu tax”).  The proposal’s motivation was to raise 
revenue to reduce the federal budget deficit, to promote energy conservation, and 
indirectly to reduce pollution associated with the combustion of fossil fuels.  The 
proposal was widely criticized in Congress, was unpopular with industry and individual 
consumers, and eventually went down in flames.  The only remnant of the initial proposal 
that eventually was passed by Congress was a small increase in the federal gasoline tax to 
bolster the Highway Trust Fund.  No new major energy policy legislation was passed by 
Congress during the rest of the decade.  In April 1999, the Clinton Administration 
proposed comprehensive electricity industry restructuring and competition legislation, 
but neither it nor Republican alternatives got very far in Congress.    
 
Energy policy during the rest of the decade relied heavily on the framework and 
policies embodied in the Energy Policy Act of 1992, associated state initiatives to 
restructure the electricity industry to promote wholesale and retail competition, the 
continued implementation of FERC regulations supporting the evolution of the 
restructured natural gas industry, new state initiatives to expand “customer choice” of 
natural gas supplier to residential and commercial customers served by local distribution 
companies (LDC),  and the effects of the Clean Air Act of 1990 on coal use in the electric 
power industry.   The major energy policy venues for gas and electricity policies were the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (natural gas, electricity) and state regulatory 
commissions.   
 
The Department of Energy’s policies were heavily influenced by the 
Administration’s environmental policy agenda, including concerns about global climate 
change.  The DOE gradually reallocated R&D funding and policy initiatives away from 
coal and nuclear R&D programs toward programs focused on promoting energy 
efficiency and renewable energy supplies, and the development of more efficient vehicles 
that use fuels other than petroleum. Federal expenditures supporting energy efficiency, 
renewables, and alternative fuel vehicles increased significantly while funding for coal 
and nuclear technology declined.19 The Administrations efforts in these areas were first 
hampered by federal budgetary constraints that placed pressure on the DOE’s budget. 
After 1994, these initiatives were impeded by a Republican Congress that was hostile to 
the DOE in general and the Clinton administration’s favorite energy programs in 
particular.  Congress prohibited federal agencies from even studying tightening the 
existing vehicle fuel efficiency standards, placed roadblocks in the way of evaluating and 
tightening appliance efficiency standards as required by EPAct92, and rejected or cut 
back Administration proposals for tax subsidies for renewable energy and alternative fuel 
vehicles.  Congress also slowed down efforts by the Administration to shift funds toward 
                                                 
19 There was a significant increase in appropriations for fossil energy and nuclear science and technology 
programs in FY2001.  
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renewable energy and energy efficiency programs.  In response to budget constraints and 
a hostile Congress, the Clinton administration began to work with industrial groups on 
voluntary programs to develop policies to respond to global warming concerns (Climate 
Change Action Plan) and new motor vehicle technologies that would improved fuel 
economy and reduce air emissions (Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles). 
 
Early in the Administration, the DOE was an active cheerleader for spreading the 
gospel of state “integrated resources planning” (IRP) programs for regulated gas and 
electricity utilities.  However, most of the states that had been leaders in applying IRP 
were veering quickly toward initiatives to restructure their gas and electric utilities in 
order to promote wholesale and retail competition or “customers choice.”  The Clinton 
DOE team had to play “catch-up” on the electricity competition front as the states (e.g. 
California, New York, Maine, Massachusetts) that had been the primary test-beds for 
integrated resource planning and utility Demand Side Management (DSM) programs 
began to focus primarily on the problem of high electric rates and the potential for 
industry restructuring and competition to bring them down.  The electricity restructuring 
bandwagon also undermined the Climate Change Action Plan initiative as many of the 
utilities that had been active on climate change issues became occupied with industry 
restructuring, stranded cost recovery and competition issues.  The Administration did not 
propose its own federal electricity restructuring legislation until early 1999 and it too had 
a number of provisions designed to preserve utility energy efficiency and renewable 
energy programs and to tilt deregulated markets toward renewable energy through 
“portfolio” standards.  Neither the Administration’s bill nor several Republican 
alternatives ever gathered enough political support to come close to being passed.  While 
the Administration’s bill was a piece of “something for everyone” legislation, opposition 
from state officials, some vertically integrated utilities, some consumer groups, and tepid 
support from interests that supported some, but not all, of the details of the proposed 
legislation undermined the ability of the Administration to move it to a successful 
conclusion in Congress.  
 
The Administration also quietly supported or acceded to Republican policy 
initiatives that encouraged oil and gas drilling in deep water, tax and royalty relief for 
small relatively inefficient oil and gas wells, opened up additional federal lands in Alaska 
to drilling, proceeded with the privatization of federal uranium enrichment facilities and 
the Elk Hills Naval Petroleum Reserve, supported federal funding for development of 
new technologies to increase oil extraction productivity, continued the slow process of 
licensing a federal nuclear waste storage facility, supported the re-licensing of operating 
nuclear power plants and continued research on advanced reactor technology, and 
initiated a cooperative program with the U.S. automobile industry to develop more fuel-
efficient vehicle technology.  Foreign policy initiatives endeavored to diversify the 
nation’s oil supplies and to foster the independence of oil producing states that were 
created after the break-up of the Soviet Union.  The Administration also supported 
increases in the oil stored in the Strategic Petroleum Reserves (SPR) and the development 
of policies to use the SPR to respond to oil supply crises. 
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It is important to recognize that the Clinton administration demonstrated a 
continued commitment to relying primarily on market forces to allocate energy resources.  
It did not try to return to the failed price control, rationing and energy allocation policies 
of the 1970s and early 1980s.  The Clinton administration viewed the proper role of 
energy policy to be to respond to market imperfections, especially as they related to the 
environmental impacts of energy production and consumption.  It believed in using 
limited financial incentives to encourage consumers and suppliers to change their 
behavior.   It had faith that new technologies could reduce the costs of energy efficiency, 
renewable energy, alternative-fuel vehicles, and production of conventional fuels.  It also 
viewed increased supply diversity from renewable and alternative fuels as playing an 
important role in promoting national security interests as well.  Thus, the Clinton 
administration’s policies reinforced what has become a bipartisan rejection of the 
aggressive energy market intervention policies of the 1970s and early 1980s and support 
for policies focused on allowing energy markets to work, breaking down regulatory 
barriers restricting markets from working efficiently, and reflecting environmental and 
national externalities in energy policies through financial incentives and market-based 
mechanisms. 
 
C.  Energy Supply, Demand and Prices During the 1990s 
Total U.S. energy consumption grew steadily after 1991, increasing by about 17% 
between 1990 and 2000.  Consumption grew in all sectors (residential, commercial, 
industrial, transportation) during the decade and the distribution of energy consumption 
between residential, commercial, industrial and transportation sectors changed little 
between 1990 and 2000.  The economy continued to become more electricity intensive as 
electricity consumption grew by over 25% during the decade.  Energy consumption per 
real dollar of GDP continued its long historical decline, though the rate of decline was 
slower than during the 1980-1990 period when energy prices were higher. [FIGURE 9] 
Energy consumption per capita increased steadily after 1991. [FIGURE 10] 
 
The overall energy fuel supply mix in 2000 was little different from that in 1990, 
with a small increase in the share of natural gas and a small decrease in petroleum’s 
share.  Aggregate domestic energy production was roughly constant during the decade 
while oil production continued to decline. Domestic natural gas production increased 
slightly, as off-shore production and production from non-conventional sources increased 
more than conventional on-shore production declined.  Imports of natural gas from 
Canada increased significantly as the demand for natural gas increased much more 
quickly than did domestic supplies.  Coal production continued to increase slowly but 
steadily along with the continuing shift of production from the Eastern producing areas to 
those in the West.  Nuclear energy production increased significantly, despite few new 
plants being completed and nearly a dozen plants closing.  Definitive resolution of a site 
for permanent storage of nuclear waste continued to elude policymakers, though some 
military waste began to move to a site in New Mexico.  Renewable energy supplies 
increased modestly, but accounted for about the same fraction of domestic energy 
production in 2000 as in 1990.20 
                                                 
20 Almost all of the increase in renewable energy is associated with the use of wood, waste, and alcohol 
fuels.  The data for these uses is not very reliable.  Solar and wind energy supplies increased by about 50% 
 20 
 
Net imports of energy increased by more than 50% during the decade, with all of 
the increase coming after 1992.  The increase in net imports is associated with large 
increases in imports of petroleum from around the world and a large increase in imports 
of natural gas from Canada. 
 
Real fossil fuel prices declined 20% (average for decade) from their 1990 peak 
through 1999, though there is considerable volatility in oil and natural gas prices.  By 
1998/99 the real price of fossil fuels reached a level about equal to prices prevailing just 
before the 1973/74 oil embargo.  A further dramatic drop in world oil prices in 1998 
quickly reversed itself in 1999 as OPEC implemented a supply reduction program, 
facilitated by Mexico, and oil prices continued to increase during 2000.  Wellhead prices 
of natural gas, which had remained in the $2 to $3/MMbtu range through most of the 
1990s, increased dramatically beginning in the summer of 2000, with delivered prices 
rising to as high as $10/Mcf in most regions by the end of 2000 and (briefly) to as high as 
$60/Mcf in Southern California in mid-December 2000, before falling back to $3/Mcf by 
July 1, 2001.  Real electricity prices fell during the decade, with the first nominal price 
increases in many years starting to be observed in late 2000 in response to increases in 
natural gas and wholesale electricity market prices.  There was excess electric generating 
and transmission capacity in all regions of the country at the beginning of the decade.  
Little new generating or transmission capacity was added after 1992.  With growing 
demand and little new supply, the excess capacity margin gradually disappeared.  Rising 
natural gas prices, tight supplies, and delays in the completion of new generating plants 
led to dramatic increases in wholesale market prices in 1999 and especially in 2000.  Spot 
shortages of electricity occurred in California in late 2000, January and March 2001.   
 
In summary, most of the decade following Operation Desert Storm was 
characterized by abundant supplies of energy, a gas pipeline and electric power 
infrastructure with excess capacity, and stable or modestly falling real prices.  Predictions 
were for more of the same for the first decade of the 21st century.  Interest in energy 
policy largely disappeared, with the exception of electricity restructuring initiatives, 
which in turn were largely stimulated by cheap natural gas, excess generating capacity, 
and very low wholesale market prices.  The complacency about energy policy and 
satisfaction with the performance of energy markets changed quickly as oil, gasoline and 
natural gas prices increased significantly during 1999 and 2000, California’s electricity 
market collapsed, and electricity supply shortages loomed throughout the West.  When 
George W. Bush was inaugurated, he argued that the nation again faced an “energy 
crisis” driven by higher oil and natural gas prices, higher wholesale electricity prices, and 
electricity shortages in some areas of the country.  In short, the 1990’s was a new “golden 
age” for energy which happened to start and end with energy supply shocks, but largely 
proceeded without energy policy being high on the national policy agenda.  
   
                                                                                                                                                 
during the decade, but represented only about 0.1% of total domestic energy production in 2000.  More on 
renewable energy below. 
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V. PETROLEUM 
The 1990s was a decade in which U.S. policies relied primarily on unregulated 
market forces to operate to allocate resources to and within the petroleum sector.  While 
there were no major domestic petroleum policy developments during the decade, the 
Administration supported Republican sponsored legislation to stimulate off-shore drilling 
in deep water by reducing federal royalty payments,21 urged Congress to reauthorize the 
Strategic Petroleum Reserves, proposed the establishment of regional heating oil 
reservcs, sold the Elk Hills Naval Petroleum Reserve,22 initiated a set of modest 
technology transfer and support programs to increase productivity from small high cost 
oil wells, and opened up federal lands for oil and natural gas drilling, including the 
National Petroleum Reserve in Alaska and additional areas adjacent to existing 
production areas on the North Slope pf Alaska.  The Administration also pursued foreign 
policies to strengthen relationships with governments of oil producing countries and to 
encourage Caspian Sea countries and U.S. oil companies developing resources in these 
countries to build a pipeline under the Caspian Sea to Turkey in order to avoid routes 
through Iran and Russia, reducing dependence on these two countries.   
 
Environmental regulations also affected petroleum supply and demand during the 
decade.  In particular, the implementation of environmental regulations affecting the 
composition of gasoline burned in automobiles in several cities resulting from the Clean 
Air Act Amendments of 1990 and growing constraints on domestic refining capacity 
began to have a visible affect on gasoline supply and prices in some regions by the end of 
the decade.  Environmental regulations also affected petroleum supply and demand 
during the decade. In particular, the implementation of environmental regulations 
affecting the composition of gasoline burned in automobiles in several cities resulting 
from the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 and growing constraints on domestic 
refining capacity began to have a visible affect on gasoline supply and prices in some 
regions by the end of the decade.  Gasoline price spikes in 1999 and 2000 in California 
and the Midwest led to calls for price controls, which the Administration resisted.  In 
September 2000 President Clinton decided to release oil from the Strategic Petroleum 
Reserve (SPR) in response to rising world oil prices and concerns that unusually low 
heating oil inventories would lead to shortages during the following winter.   
 
Petroleum accounted for about 38% of domestic energy consumption in 2000, 
down from 40% in 1990.  Petroleum consumption grew by 15% between 1990 and 
                                                 
21 Deep Water Royalty Relief Act, P.L. 104-58, November 28, 1995. 
 
22The federal government began studying the sale of Naval Petroleum Reserve #1 (Elk Hills in California) 
and #3 (Teapot Dome in Wyoming) in 1986.  The DOE initiated the process of evaluating and selling Elk 
Hills in 1995.  The sale was completed in 1998 for $3.65 billion.  Since the Teapot Dome reserve contained 
relatively little remaining oil it was decided to produce it out rather than to sell it.  The Administration also 
initiated policies to lease or transfer to the private sector the federal Shale Oil Reserves. The primary 
motivations for these efforts were to raise funds for the federal government and to increase productivity 
from these properties. 
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2000,23 and in 1998 surpassed the previous peak consumption level reached 20 years 
earlier.  The transportation sector, primarily passenger cars and trucks, accounted for 
about 68% of U.S. oil consumption in 2000, up from about 64% in 1990.  Most of the rest 
is accounted for by the industrial sector, with little oil being used in the residential and 
commercial sectors or to generate electricity.  Petroleum policies and policies affecting 
automobile and truck fuel efficiency and utilization are clearly highly interdependent. 
(Automobile fuel efficiency policies are discussed below.) 
 
Domestic oil production continued to decline steadily during the 1990s as imports 
increased.  By the end of 2000, the U.S, was importing 56% of its petroleum and 
petroleum imports increased by 40% during the decade.  Overall, imported energy 
increased from 17% of total energy consumption in 1990 to 25% in 2000.  In the mid-
1990s aggregate energy imports surpassed the previous peak level reached in 1977 and 
by 2000 had exceeded that import level by 36%.  By the end of the decade, the U.S. was 
far more dependent on imported energy in general and imported petroleum in particular 
than it had been since the mid-1970s, just before the second oil shock.24  However, it is 
also important to recognize that the energy intensity of the U.S. economy declined 
significantly during this period; energy consumption by dollar of real GDP in 2000 was 
about 60% of what it was in 1977. 
 
Crude oil prices declined from their 1990 peaks during the most of the decade, 
though there is significant year-to-year price volatility.  Crude oil prices plummeted 
during 1998, apparently as a result of declining imports from Asian countries 
experiencing an economic contraction and subsequent economic problems in Russia.  
Gasoline prices followed a similar pattern [FIGURE 11].  Domestic oil and gas drilling 
activity followed these price trends fairly closely [FIGURE 12 and FIGURE 13].  
Falling crude prices had a significant adverse impact on oil exporting countries.  In 1999, 
the Mexican Minister of Energy worked closely with Venezuela and other OPEC 
countries to curtail supplies in an effort to drive up prices.  While these efforts initially 
met with little success, they eventually led to coordinated supply curtailments.  World 
petroleum demand increased as the economies of countries in Europe and Asia recovered 
and oil prices began to rise rapidly.  Oil prices rose significantly in 1999 and increased 
further in 2000 as world demand continued to increase as supplies tightened.  Oil prices 
peaked at an average price of about $31/barrel of crude oil during the fall of 2000 and 
then fell back to the $25-$27 range during the first four months of 2001.   The increase in 
crude oil (and natural gas) prices has stimulated a very significant increase in domestic 
drilling activity, with the number of oil and gas wells drilled each month doubling from 
mid-1999 levels by the end of 2000.  Despite the significant price increases that occurred 
after mid-1999, real oil and product prices remained at levels far below their peaks in 
1980-81, though higher than the local price peaks reached in 1990. 
                                                 
23 This is about the same growth rate experience by the OECD countries as a whole and for OECD Europe. 
 
24Petroleum supplied by OPEC countries increased to 43% of world production in 2000 from 38% in 1990. 
OPEC accounted for a much smaller proportion of world production in 2000 (43%) than it did in 1973 
(56%).  
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As U.S. petroleum consumption has increased, the availability of domestic 
capacity to refine crude oil into petroleum products has become a growing problem.  The 
U.S. experienced a steep decline in refining capacity since its peak in 1981, though most 
of this decline occurred before 1987. [FIGURE 14]  About 3 MMBD of refining 
capacity was closed during the 1980s, after price controls and allocations ended.  These 
regulations had propped up small inefficient refineries and they exited the market as these 
regulations were repealed.  Though the number of refineries has continued to decline, and 
no new refineries have been built in many years, total refining capacity was roughly 
constant during the decade, with a significant expansion in capacity after 1994 resulting 
from expansion of existing refineries.25  Growing demand for refined products and 
roughly constant refining capacity led to increasing refinery capacity utilization rates 
around during the 1990s, with capacity utilization reportedly increased to 98.5% by the 
end of 2000.  Future expansions in refining capacity are expected at some existing 
refineries and outside the U.S., including in Mexico and South America.  It is unlikely 
that major new refinery sites will be developed in the U.S. unless regulatory restrictions 
on siting new refineries change significantly.   
 
The extremely high levels of refinery capacity utilization mean that refined 
product supplies and prices are very sensitive to unplanned refinery outages resulting to 
equipment breakdowns, fires, etc., since there is essentially no reserve capacity in the 
system.  Accordingly, product demand and supply availability fluctuations must be fully 
absorbed by product inventories, which had also declined in the last few years.  This 
sensitivity of product prices to refinery (and oil pipeline) outages has increased as a 
consequence of the growing regional differentiation in the composition of gasoline 
required to meet environmental regulations on a seasonal basis.  There are now as many 
as 40 “micro-brews” of gasoline (including octane differences) sold in the  U.S. 
 
In the last ten years, the refinery industry has had to respond to five sets of new 
environmental regulations affecting motor gasoline product composition:26 
 
 Phase I Summer Volatility Regulation (RVP): 1989 
 Phase II Summer Volatility Regulation (RVP): 1992 
 Oxygenated Gasoline Rules    1992  
 Reformulated Gasoline Phase I   (RFG)  1994 
 Reformulated Gasoline Phase II   (RFG)  2000 
 
These regulations have required significant changes in refinery operations and 
investments in plant and equipment.  In total, the regulations have been estimated to have 
                                                 
25 See Winter Fuels Outlook, Energy Information Administration, October 2000.  Contrary to some 
conventional wisdom, refining capacity did not decline during the 1990s.  It increased slightly overall, with 
more that 100% of the increase between 1990 and 2000 coming after 1994. 
 
26 See Tancred C.M. Lidderdale “Environmental Regulations and Changes in Petroleum Refining 
Operations,” Energy Information Administration, http://www.eia.giv/emeu/steo/pub/special/enviro.html, 
March 22, 2001. 
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increased gasoline prices by amounts in the range of 7 to 10 cents/gallon.27  Perhaps more 
importantly, because different states have different requirements for gasoline 
composition, some states and regions have become more dependent on a small number of 
refineries that can produce gasoline meeting local requirements.28  This means that 
regional demand or supply side shocks can have larger impacts on prices in particular 
areas of the country than would be the case if there was more refinery capacity producing 
approved fuels available to meet supply and demand shocks.   The benefits of giving 
states flexibility in choosing whether and how to restrict gasoline compositions to meet 
ambient air quality standards may not be worth the growing costs of this flexibility.   
 
 The introduction of the EPA’s Phase II regulations for summer-blend 
reformulated gasoline in high ozone urban areas likely contributed to the localized 
gasoline price spikes experienced in the Midwest during the first half of 2000.  As 
discussed above, crude, gasoline and product prices increased dramatically during the 
second half of 1999 and during 2000 throughout the U.S.  However, the increase in 
gasoline prices was much more extreme in a few Midwestern cities than it was in most of 
the rest of the country during this period of time.  These regulations went into effect on 
May 1, 2000 at the wholesale level in both Chicago and Milwaukee.  An FTC study 
found that the new, more-stringent regulations may have contributed to abnormally low 
inventories for several reasons.  They required that winter-blend gasoline be drained from 
storage tanks before the summer-blend supply could be added, which led to lower 
inventories than usual.  Apparently, summer-blend Phase II RFG also proved to be more 
difficult to refine than anticipated, causing refinery yields to be less than expected.  
Moreover, the FTC study suggests that the ethanol-based RFG used in Chicago and 
Milwaukee was even more difficult to produce.  Further, St. Louis entered the RFG 
program in 2000, and this further increased demand for RFG in the Midwest. The FTC 
study noted that additional, non-RFG factors, also contributed to the increase in gasoline 
prices in the Midwest during summer 2000.29 30 Finally, the FTC concluded that supplier 
behavior that caused the Midwestern gasoline price spikes during summer 2000 did not 
violate the antitrust laws.31   
                                                 
27 Ibid.  and references cited there. 
 
28 Some states have voluntary adopted restrictions on gasoline composition during different seasons and 
states retain some flexibility regarding the precise “micro-brew” they rely on to meet environmental 
regulations.  
 
29  Final Report of the Federal Trade Commission, Midwest Gasoline Price Investigation, March 29, 2000. 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001/03/mwgasrpt.htm. See also the FTC’s Interim Report, 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/07/gasprice.htm. 
 
30 Another possible contributor to the Midwest price increases was the break in the Explorer pipeline in 
March. Explorer moves refined petroleum products from the Gulf of Mexico through St. Louis to Chicago 
and other parts of the Midwest. The pipeline break caused a disruption in the supply of gasoline to the 
already tight Midwest markets. That could have exacerbated an already tight supply situation and 
contributed to rising prices throughout the region. Ibid. 
 
31 In May 2001 the FTC closed an investigation of gasoline price spikes in the Western U.S. which it began 
in 1998, concluding that the prices at issue were not the result of behavior that violated the antitrust laws. 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2001/05/westerngas.htm.  
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As noted earlier, the SPR was created in late 1975 pursuant to the Energy Policy 
and Conservation Act. (EPCA).  EPCA provided for the establishment of a petroleum 
reserve of up to 1 billion barrels.  Salt caverns were subsequently acquired along the Gulf 
coast to store the oil, and crude oil began to be stored there in 1977.  Oil stored in the 
SPR peaked in 1994 at 592 million barrels and, after some test sales, settled at 570 
million barrels by the late 1990s.  Under EPCA, the President must determine if a draw 
down is required by “a severe energy supply disruption or by obligations of the United 
States” under the International Energy Treaty.  EPCA goes on to discuss the 
characteristics of such a severe supply disruption and these include that the supply 
disruption be of significant scope and duration, and cause major adverse impact on 
national safety or the national economy.  Prior to September 2000, the SPR had been 
drawn down for a couple of test sales and during Operation Desert Storm in early 1991. 
 
On September 22, 2000, President Clinton authorized the release of 30 million 
barrels of oil from the SPR over a 30-day period.  The objective was to increase domestic 
supplies during the prevailing tight supply situation and, in particular, to increase supplies 
of heating oil which were projected to be in short supply during the coming winter.  
Heating oil inventories were at unusually low levels during 2000 and oil prices continued 
to increase as the year progressed.  [FIGURE 15 and 16]  Very low heating oil stocks 
going into the fall were of particular concern given the lags between crude oil deliveries, 
refining, and delivery to local oil terminals.   
 
The proposed release from the SPR was very controversial both inside and outside 
the administration.  The release was opposed by Treasury and State.  Those opposed were 
concerned that the federal government was marching down the path of speculating on 
future oil price movements and that these interventions would be ineffective because 
private oil inventory and production decisions would simply work in the opposite 
direction.  In the end, the White House decided to release oil to demonstrate that it was 
doing something to respond to rising prices and potential heating oil shortages.  The 
release was structured as a “swap” rather than a sale of oil, apparently partly to avoid 
dealing with EPCA’s criteria for selling SPR oil.  Under a swap arrangement oil was 
released from the SPR and would be replaced later by a larger amount of oil, with the 
terms of the swap determined by competitive bidding.  It is hard to know what, if any, 
effects this modest release had on heating oil stocks or prices.  There is no obvious 
change in the trajectory of heating oil stocks after the release, though crude oil and 
product prices did fall significantly after November.  [FIGURE 16]  
 
The “let the market work” approach to petroleum markets did have some 
potentially adverse consequences.  Imports of petroleum increased significantly.  During 
this period, petroleum demand continued to grow, improvements in vehicle efficiency 
stagnated (more on this presently), domestic production declined, petroleum imports 
increased to their highest levels in history.  U.S. imports of petroleum now exceed 10 
million barrels per day.  The Energy Information Administration projects a continuing 
decline in domestic production and increasing imports of petroleum over the next two 
decades.  By 2020, imports are projected to account for roughly 75% of U.S. petroleum 
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consumption.  There is little chance that much can be done to significantly change this 
trend through domestic “supply side” initiatives, despite the fact that real oil prices are 
projected to increase significantly over the next 20 years in all EIA cases.   As I will 
discuss presently, the Clinton administration did little to curtail oil demand growth by, for 
example, tightening vehicle fuel efficiency standards, largely because Congress made it 
virtually impossible for the Administration even to study changes in fuel economy 
standards.  For those concerned about U.S. dependence on imported oil, the 1990s did not 
end well.  While the U.S. and other oil importing countries are much less dependant on 
Middle Eastern oil producers than was the case in the 1970s, the share of world 
production accounted for by Middle Eastern and North African countries has begun to 
grow once again.  Moreover, these countries account for 70% of world petroleum 
reserves and dependence on them is likely to continue to grow. 
 
The Administration’s primary direct response to the national security implications 
of rising oil imports was to strengthen relationships with governments of oil producing 
countries, to encourage Caspian Sea countries and producers to choose an export pipeline 
route that did not cross Iran or Russia, and to maintain a significant military presence in 
the Middle East. 
 
VI. NATURAL GAS 
During the 1990’s natural gas was widely viewed as “the fossil fuel of choice.”  It 
is relatively clean (its combustion produces less CO2, SO2, and NOx than do coal and oil 
yielding equivalent useful energy), it was relatively cheap and it could fuel new efficient 
combined-cycle gas turbine (CCGT) electric generating facilities.  The CCGT facilities in 
turn were ideally suited for supporting the evolving competitive electricity markets since 
they could be built quickly, at relatively small minimum efficient scale, were less capital 
intensive, and could be more easily sited than conventional generating plants.  The 
primary policy initiatives related directly to natural gas focused on completing the 
program begun in the 1980s to open up access to interstate natural gas pipelines to 
competing marketers and brokers who could then buy gas in the field at unregulated 
markets.  The Administration’s support for the Republican Sponsored Deep Water 
Royalty Relief Act of 1995 encouraged exploration, development of continued 
production of natural gas from marginal reserves in the Gulf of Mexico.  The 
Administration also supported legislation to provide limited tax incentives for oil and gas 
production.32  Several states introduced open access or retail “customer choice” programs 
to enable residential and small commercial customers to buy unbundled distribution 
service from their local gas distribution utility (LDC) and buy commodity natural gas 
separately from an unregulated intermediary.  In addition, federal and state policies 
supporting restructuring and competition in the electricity sector were viewed as an 
indirect way to encourage increased use of natural gas to generate electricity. 
 
Natural gas accounted for 24% of U.S. energy use in 2000, up from 23% in 1990.  
U.S. natural gas consumption increased by 22% between 1990 and 2000. [FIGURE 17] 
                                                 
32 The proposals would have allowed oil producers to expense certain geological, geophysical and lease 
costs. 
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Electricity produced with natural gas increased by 57% between 1990 and 2000 and 
almost all new electric generating plants under construction at the end of the decade were 
fueled by natural gas.33  Natural gas consumption is projected to continue to grow rapidly 
in the next two decades, increasing by roughly 50% by 2020.34  Natural gas’s share of 
total energy consumption is projected to grow to 33.1% in 2020.  This increase in 
projected natural gas consumption is dominated by rapidly growing utilization of natural 
gas to produce electricity, using CCGT generating technology. 
 
Domestic natural gas production increased by only about 8% between 1990 and 
2000; domestic production was roughly constant from 1994 to 1999 before increasing 
again in 2000 in response to significantly higher prices.  Production from off-shore wells, 
unconventional sources, and gas associated with the production of oil all increased during 
the decade.35  From 1994 to 1997 natural gas reserve additions exceeded actual 
production, however in 1998 and 1999 reserve additions fell short of actual production, 
and this is likely to have been true as well during 2000.36  After declining significantly 
during the 1980s, gas-finding costs appear to have stabilized.37 The decline is gas finding 
costs may be attributed in part to the opening up of more federal lands for drilling and, in 
particular, the expansion of drilling in the deep waters of the Gulf of Mexico. With 
rapidly growing consumption and stagnant domestic production, imports of gas were 
required to balance supply and demand.  Imports from Canada increased by about 50% 
during the 1990s, new reserves were developed offshore of Eastern Canada, and new 
pipelines built, providing gas for New England and the Northeast.  The deteriorating 
reserve additions situation, the leveling out of gas finding costs, stagnant domestic 
production, the “separation” of gas from oil prices due to what was characterized as a 
“gas bubble,” and the growing demand for gas in the electricity sector probably should 
have been a warning that natural gas prices would soon rise. However, this was not 
widely predicted by experts at the time.38   
 
Real natural gas prices were roughly constant through most of the decade, though 
there was considerable year-to-year price variation.  [FIGURE 18] Wellhead prices of 
natural gas were generally below the BTU equivalent price of oil during the 1990s.  
                                                 
33 Based on first quarter 2001 data on generating plants (nearly 50,000 Mw) actually under construction 
provided to me by Argus.  Natural gas used to generate electricity likely increased at a slower rate during 
the decade as more efficient CCGT capacity was completed.  However, the EIA data presently available do 
not make it possible to derive accurate estimates of natural gas utilization to generate electricity after 1998. 
 
34 Annual Energy Outlook 2001, Energy Information Administration, December 2000, pages 82-86. 
 
35 Barbara Mariner-Volpe, “The Evolution of Gas Markets in the United States, May 2000, a presentation 
made available by the Energy Information Service.  
 
36 Ibid. Year 2000 data on reserve additions were not yet available in May 2001. 
 
37 [A discussion of the Deep Water Royalty Relief Act of 1995 will be included here.] 
 
38 Most pre-2000 forecasts were for natural gas prices in the $2 to $3 range in 2010. 
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Natural gas also had superior air pollution emissions attributes.39  As a result, natural gas 
drove oil out of most boiler fuel uses (e.g. industrial boilers and conventional steam 
electricity production).  However, beginning in mid-2000, natural gas prices began to rise 
rapidly to levels far above prevailing predictions or historical experience. [FIGURE 19]  
By late summer 2000 natural gas prices had risen to about $5/mmbtu at Henry Hub and 
climbed to near $10 by the end of the year, before declining back to about $5/mmbtu by 
late March 2001 and about $4 by June 1, 2001 and $3 by July 1, 2001.  Prices in 
California reached much higher levels as pipeline constraints caused prices in California 
to rise to levels far above those prevailing in the rest of the country.40 [TABLE 1] The 
forward price curves in early July 2001 suggest that for the next few years natural gas 
prices will be in the $3.00 to $3.75/Mcf range, significantly higher than most predictions 
had indicated as recently as March 2000.  If this increase in the projected level and 
trajectory of natural gas prices is sustained,41 it is likely to have significant implications 
for electricity prices (higher), existing coal plants (run them more and keep them running 
longer, and for investments in new generating capacity (several new coal generating 
plants were announced after gas prices exploded in late 2000).  
 
The reasons for the unexpected increases in natural gas prices during 2000 are not 
yet well understood.  Several factors are likely to be at work.  First, natural gas demand 
increased by about 5% during 2000, after several years of stability, and continuing 
increases in demand are anticipated going forward as many new CCGT plants will be 
completed in 2001 and 2002.  Second, natural gas in short-term underground storage was 
at unusually low levels in early 2000 and average storage levels for the year were at their 
lowest levels since 1978. [FIGURE 20 and FIGURE 21]  Third, oil and gas well 
drilling activity had declined significantly in 1998 and the first half of 1999 in response 
to falling prices and net reserves declined in 1998 and 1999 as production exceeded new 
reserves.  Drilling activity began to increase in mid-1999 in response to rising oil prices 
and increased further in mid-2000 as natural gas prices rose.  Finally, with growing 
demand anticipated and tighter supplies ending a decade long “gas bubble” and “gas to 
gas” competition period, some analysts have argued that gas prices will rise to levels 
closer to price per BTU equivalence with oil products once again.42  According to this 
                                                 
39 During the early 1980s, a rule of thumb was that wellhead prices of gas would tend to equilibrate at about 
90% of the BTU equivalent price of crude oil, with gas and residual fuel oil competing at the burner tip for 
the boiler fuel market.  During the 1990-99 period wellhead prices were generally well below this level, 
except during periods when oil prices suddenly dropped or during unusually cold winters.  It is the low gas 
prices experienced for almost 15 years, rather than regulatory obstacles, that made the investments in gas 
pipeline capacity to bring gas from Northern Alaska and Northern Canada to the lower 48 states 
unattractive. 
 
40 Whether the high prices in California were caused by real pipeline and local storage constraints or 
reflected (at least in part) the market power of those controlling pipeline capacity into Southern California 
is an issue in dispute and litigation. 
 
41 Most experts I have consulted are looking for long-term gas prices at much lower levels than prevailed 
between June 2000 and May 2001; in the $3 to $3.50/Mcf  range.  
 
42 J. Jensen, “North American Natural Gas Markets:  The Revenge of the Old Economy,” presentation at 
the MIT CEEPR Workshop, May 4, 2001. 
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view, rising oil prices help to explain the unanticipated increase in natural gas prices and 
oil and gas prices will be more closely linked in the future.43   
 
Putting aside the excitement in gas markets during 2000, natural gas policy during 
the post-1992 period focused on the continued implementation of the open access and 
unbundling provisions of Order 636.  The natural gas industry reforms begun during the 
1980s were largely completed during the 1990s.  They have proven to be an important, 
though sometimes misapplied, model for restructuring the electric power sector.  
 
Since the prices for natural gas pipeline capacity continued to be regulated under 
Order 636, during the 1990s considerable effort was devoted to reforming interstate 
pipeline transportation pricing policies --- peak and off peak pipeline transportation 
prices, firm and interruptible contracts, gas storage services to support competitive 
markets for gas itself, and associated financial derivative markets upon which buyers and 
sellers increasingly came to rely upon to hedge gas price volatility.  One of the more 
contentious sets of issues was associated with the resale of transportation capacity 
“released” by pipelines and other market participants who had purchased firm pipeline 
capacity.   Order 636 required pipelines to establish capacity release programs to make 
unused capacity available to third parties.  FERC also allowed shippers to resell or 
“release” firm capacity rights that they have acquired.  However, the resale arrangements 
continued to be regulated in various ways, including through prices caps on short-term 
capacity release transactions based on the original regulated sale price of the firm 
capacity, without properly reflecting peak and off-peak utilization and cost differences.  
In February 2000, FERC issued Order 637 to resolve some of these issues.  The order 
waives the price cap on short-term capacity release transactions, implements peak and 
off-peak rates for firm pipeline capacity, and makes a number of other changes. 
 
The federal interstate pipeline access and unbundling programs have largely been 
successful in achieving their primary goals.44  LDCs and large gas customers can now 
easily purchase natural gas in a competitive gas market (directly or through 
intermediaries) and are taking advantage of these opportunities.  Competitive liquid 
markets for futures and options contracts have emerged to facilitate risk management by 
buyers, sellers and intermediaries.  Gas transportation prices have fallen and, prior to 
mid-2000, natural gas prices were reasonably stable and very competitive with other fuels 
during the decade.45  In 1995, a few states began to extend the unbundling concept to 
residential gas customers and by March 2000, four states had implemented a customer 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
43 There appears to be another factor at work in 2000 as well.  In “the old days,” a gas price spike like the 
one experience in 2000 would have led many utility and some industrial boilers to shift from gas to oil very 
quickly.  While some switching did take place in 2000, the magnitude was small.  I believe that this reflects 
environmental restrictions that have been placed on electric generating plants that limit the amount of oil 
that they can burn and the conditions under which they can burn it. 
 
44 The following discussion relies on Barbara Mariner-Volpe, op. cit. 
 
45 Barbara Mariner-Volpe, op. cit. 
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choice program for all residential customers, 7 more states were in the process of doing 
so, and 12 states had implemented pilot programs to test out the concept.46   
 
The increasing utilization of natural gas to generate electricity has and will require 
significant increases in interstate gas pipeline capacity and gas storage facilities.  There 
were very significant increases in gas pipeline and gas storage capacity during the 
1990s.47  Even larger investments are being made in new pipeline capacity that is under 
construction or planned for completion in the first part of this decade.48  The realization 
of the large expected increases in future natural gas consumption depends critically both 
on expanding gas reserves and expanding the gas pipeline transportation and storage 
infrastructure.  Future, pipeline projects must confront three sets of challenges.   
 
First, investors must expect to get an appropriate risk-adjusted return on their 
investments in pipeline capacity.  There are two important factors that must be taken into 
consideration to satisfy this constraint.  FERC still regulates pipeline charges based on 
cost-of-service principles.  Historically, pipeline projects would go forward after the 
pipeline had lined up long term firm contracts for a significant amount of the pipeline’s 
capacity and the proponents could demonstrated that the pipeline was “needed” to serve 
this demand.  In a world where pipelines are selling transportation service to serve a 
growing number of customers who are themselves operating in competitive markets 
(power generating companies, marketers, LDCs with uncertain future obligations to 
supply gas along with distribution service), it may be very difficult for pipeline 
developers to rely on very long term contracts to support financing of their projects.  
More importantly, FERC’s methods for calculating pipeline charges were developed in 
an era where transportation customers entered into very long term contracts and took on 
the market risks associated with these obligations.  With the new market institutions, 
some of this market risk will inevitably (optimally) be shifted back to the pipelines.  If 
FERC regulation does not reflect the associated increases in capital costs, it will delay or 
deter necessary pipeline investments. 
 
The second set of potential problems involves local opposition to new pipeline 
facilities.  While the Natural Gas Act gives FERC substantial siting authority (unlike the 
situation with electric transmission facilities), state and local authorities are still a force to 
deal with.  While the “Nimby” syndrome has not yet been as significant a problem for 
gas pipelines as it has been for electric generation and transmission projects, the 
continued local efforts to block pipeline projects is a continuing concern.  During the 
1990s, the U.S. was able to more fully exploit a gas and electric infrastructure that had 
excess supply capability at the beginning of the decade.  The excess capacity has been 
used up (or more than used up).  People may have become comfortable with increasing 
consumption without seeing major new supply projects.  That era has come to an end and 
                                                 
46 Status of Natural Gas Residential Choice Programs By State, Energy Information Administration, 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oil_gas/restructure/restructure.html, March 11, 2001. 
 
47 Barbara Mariner-Volpe, op. cit.. 
 
48 ibid. 
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we are entering a period when conflicts over siting of energy supply facilities is likely to 
intensify once again.   
 
Third, the future evolution of the natural gas industry is closely tied with 
developments in the electric power industry.  The incomplete nature of electricity sector 
restructuring, competition and regulatory reforms and the turmoil caused by recent events 
in California increases uncertainty and investment hurdle rates for the development of 
new gas fields and pipeline facilities. 
 
Despite these potential problems, the natural gas pipeline industry was generally 
successful in expanding natural gas pipeline capacity (and gas storage capacity) to meet 
the growing demand for natural gas during the 1990s.    
 
Where is all of the natural gas projected to fuel future electric power generation, 
commercial and industrial demand over the next decade going to come from?  Until May 
2000, the general view was that natural gas was abundant and would continue to be very 
cheap.  However, the dramatic increase in gas prices since May 2000, and the upward 
shift of the forward curve going out two years suggests that these assumptions may need 
to be revised.  Rising natural gas prices have potentially important implications for future 
gas demand, electricity prices, and demand for coal used to generate electricity.  The 
ultimate price trajectory will depend heavily on the cost of developing new supplies in 
the U.S., Canada (the sole exporter of non-liquified natural gas to the U.S.) and perhaps 
other countries which may be able to supply liquefied natural gas to the U.S., on the cost 
of transporting natural gas from Northern Alaska and Northwestern Canada through 
Alberta, on federal policies governing drilling on federal lands, and on into the U.S., and 
the ability to expand domestic pipeline capacity to accommodate rapidly growing 
demand.  Domestic natural gas production has been projected to increase by roughly 50% 
over the next twenty years, after increasing only 8% during the 1990s, and these 
projections assume that gas prices will not rise above the average level prevailing in 2000 
(after falling in the next few years) by 2020.  Imports, primarily from Canada, are 
projected to increase by about 80%, and would account for nearly 20% of U.S. natural 
gas consumption by 2002.49  These projections reflect the assumption that modestly 
higher gas prices will lead to significant increases in reserves and production from on-
shore, off-shore and non-conventional non-associated sources (not found with oil).  
Production from the first two of these sources has been roughly constant in the last few 
years, so the projections reflect the assumption of a significant change in recent historical 
production trends.  The price increases required to realize these production increases are 
very uncertain and without major improvements in drilling technology, much larger price 
increases may be necessary to bring forth this level of additional natural gas supplies.  
The recent renewed interest in expanding imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) suggests 
that some investors expect natural gas prices to remain relatively high and that more 
costly LNG imports will be required to balance supply and demand. 
 
 
                                                 
49 Annual Energy Outlook 2001, Energy Information Administration, December 2000, pages 82-86. 
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VII. ELECTRICITY 
A. Background 
Electricity accounts for about 36% of U.S. energy consumption, after taking 
account of the thermal losses associated with the transformation of fossil fuel into 
electricity.50  In 2000, coal accounted for 52%, nuclear for 20% and natural gas for 16% 
of the electricity supplied.  Conventional hydro (7%), oil (3%) and renewable energy 
(2%) accounted for the rest of the electricity supplied in 2000.  [FIGURE 22 AND 
FIGURE 23].  The proportions of fuels used to generate electricity changed relatively 
little between 1990 and 2000, with natural gas accounting for a larger fraction (16% vs. 
12%) and conventional hydro (10% vs. 7%) a smaller fraction. [FIGURE 24]  Electricity 
consumption grew by about 28% [FIGURE 25] and peak demand grew by about 25% 
between 1989 and 1999.  The U.S. began the decade with substantially more generating 
and transmission capacity than “needed” to meet current demand according to standard 
reserve margin criteria.  Relatively little investment in new electric generating facilities 
was made during the decade, however.  Generating capacity available to meet peak 
demand grew by only about 7% during the 1989 to 1999 period while (non-coincident) 
peak demand increased by nearly 30% during this time period. [FIGURE 26]  
Investments in new high voltage transmission lines also increased by only about 7% 
during this period as well.  Accordingly, electricity consumption grew much more rapidly 
than did generating and transmission capacity during the decade.  By the end of the 
decade the excess capacity had largely disappeared and spot shortages of power began to 
appear in some regions of the country, especially in the West.  The real price of retail 
electricity continued to fall during the 1990s, reaching real price levels prevailing in 1974 
by the end of the decade. [FIGURE 27] However, retail electricity prices began to rise 
again in a number of areas in 2000, following the increases in natural gas and wholesale 
power prices. 
 
The electric power sector experienced the most profound structural and regulatory 
changes of any of the energy sectors during the 1990s.  These changes were facilitated by 
a combination of wholesale market reforms initiated by FERC as it implemented portions 
of the Energy Policy Act of 1992 and individual state initiatives to restructure their 
electric utilities to take advantage of competitive wholesale markets and to create 
competitive retail markets which would allow consumers to choose their power supplier 
who would use the local utility distribution system to deliver power to them.   The 
Clinton Administration’s role in these developments was modest.  The rapid evolution of 
federal and state restructuring activity surprised the DOE and the administration played 
catch-up during the last half of the decade.   
  
For most of the 20th century, the U.S. electric power industry was organized 
primarily around investor-owned electric utilities that had de facto exclusive franchises to 
serve all consumers in designated geographic areas.51  The prices that the utilities could 
                                                 
50 The actual number is somewhat higher when electricity produced by industrial generators and 
cogenerators is fully taken into account.  The measurement of the fuel used by these facilities is buried in 
commercial and industrial fossil fuel consumption data. 
51 A more detailed discussion of the structure and regulation of the electric utility industry prior to the late 
1990s can be found in Joskow, op. cit. 1989 and P. Joskow,  “Deregulation and Regulatory Reform in the 
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charge to retail consumers were regulated by state public utility commissions, based on 
their “cost of service,” including a “fair rate of return” on investment.  In return for their 
exclusive franchises, utilities had an obligation to serve all consumers requesting service 
at the prices approved by their state regulatory commissions.  Utilities met their 
obligation to serve by investing in distribution, generation and transmission facilities.  
That is, utilities were vertically integrated into the three primary electricity supply 
segments and provided  “bundled” retail service to their franchise customers.  Unlike 
most other countries, the U.S. had a large number of vertically integrated utilities serving 
relatively small geographic areas rather than a single dominant enterprise serving most of 
the country.  Over time, however, transmission and generating technology evolved in 
ways that made the economic supply areas regional rather than local.  Rather than 
encouraging horizontal mergers to create much larger utilities to span economical supply 
areas, U.S. policies since the 1930s encouraged utilities to interconnect their transmission 
systems with one another, to build facilities jointly, to coordinate and share operating 
reserves and to trade power among themselves in wholesale markets when a utility with 
surplus energy could produce more cheaply than could a proximate utility from its own 
generating facilities.  The prices of third-party transmission service (‘wheeling”) and 
wholesale trades of power between utilities have been regulated by the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC), formerly the Federal Power Commission, since 1935.  
However, prior to EPAct92 FERC had no authority to order utilities to provide 
transmission service or to require utilities to build power plants or transmission facilities 
to provide wholesale power or transmission service.  As a result, regulatory authority for 
utility investments, operating costs and prices lay primarily with individual state 
regulatory agencies.52  In addition, the Public Utility Holding Company Act (PUHCA) of 
1935 gave the SEC regulatory jurisdiction over the structure of public utility holding 
companies, their geographic expanse, internal transfer prices, and the kinds of businesses 
that they could engage in.53 
 
 The Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA) played an important 
role in stimulating interest in expanding opportunities for non-utility suppliers to compete 
to build an operate power plants to supply of electric generation service to utilities for 
resale and created a powerful interest group to promote it.  Title II of PURPA required 
utilities to purchase power produced by certain “Qualified Facilities” (QFs) using 
cogeneration and renewable energy technology at a price reflecting the utility’s “avoided 
costs” of supplying the power from its own facilities.  These provisions of PURPA were 
                                                                                                                                                 
U.S. Electric Power Sector,” in Deregulation of Network Industries: The Next Steps (S. Peltzman and 
Clifford Winston, eds.), Brookings Press, 2000. 
 
52 IOUs historically accounted for about 80% of industry supplies.  The rest is accounted for by municipal, 
cooperative, and federal power supply and distribution entities.  I will not discuss these entities here. 
 
53 A public utility holding company is a company that owns more than one utility operating company.  
PUHCA placed draconian restrictions on public utility holding companies with utility subsidiaries in more 
than one state.  These restrictions severely limited the geographic areas in which a public utility holding 
company could operate, the lines of business that it could engage in (only those closely related to its utility 
operations), foreign investments in utilities in other countries, and investments by foreign utilities in U.S. 
utility businesses. 
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motivated by a desire to encourage more efficient electricity production technologies 
(cogeneration) and non-fossil technologies (renewables) reflect the 1970’s goals of 
reducing dependence on foreign oil (though little oil is used to generate electricity) and 
reducing emissions of air pollution from fossil fueled power plants.  Some states 
embraced PURPA with gusto, pressed utilities to rely as much as possible of PURPA 
facilities, and required them to enter into high-priced long term contracts to encourage 
third-party investment in PURPA generating facilities.  These states were primarily those 
with politically powerful environmental groups and high retail electricity prices such as 
California, New York, the New England states, and a few others along the east and west 
coasts.  Other states were indifferent and placed little pressure on their utilities to turn to 
third party suppliers for power.  While PURPA was originally conceived primarily as an 
energy efficiency and environmental program, it soon became a demonstration project for 
the virtues of relying on competitive supplies from non-utility producers and was the 
primary vehicle undermining the traditional vertically integrated structure of electricity 
supply.  By 1991, nearly 10% of electricity supplies was coming from non-utility 
generating facilities, primarily PURPA facilities heavily concentrated in California, the 
Northeast, Texas, and a few other states.  Few utility-owned power plants were built in 
these states after the mid-1980s.  Power supplied from “non-utility” generating plants 
increased by 400% during the 1990s. [FIGURE 28].  Until 1996, the increase in non-
utility generation displayed in Figure 25 reflected primarily the completion of PURPA 
facilities and a few non-PURPA independent power projects.  After 1996, the increase 
reflects primarily the divestiture of generating plants by regulated utilities subject to 
electricity restructuring programs in California, the Northeast, Illinois, and Montana to 
independent power suppliers and the entry of new capacity developed by independent 
power producers in these and other states.   We turn to these latter developments now. 
 
 The enthusiastic implementation of PURPA by California, New York, the New 
England states and a few others was heavily influenced by environmental interests and 
concerns.  By the late 1980s it would not be unreasonable to conclude that the regulatory 
process, especially as it related to electric utility resource planning and acquisition 
programs, had been captured by environmental interests in these states.  In conjunction 
with the implementation of PURPA, these states adopted complex public planning 
processes to review utility investments, power purchase arrangements with PURPA 
suppliers, and to encourage utilities to “invest in customer energy efficiency” as an 
alternative to acquiring additional power supplies through ownership or contract.  They 
also required utilities to give preference to cogeneration and renewable energy sources by 
placing “environmental adders” on the direct costs of power supplies.   These planning 
processes were referred to as “integrated resource planning” or “least cost planning.”  
They were a way to use the institution of regulated monopoly to pay for environmentally 
friendly supply sources and energy efficiency programs which traditional utility planning 
protocols would not have viewed as being “least cost.”  Most of these states also 
experienced significant increases in the regulated retail prices of electricity during the 
1970s and 1980s.  By the mid-1990s retail prices in many of these states were far above 
the national average [TABLE 2 and TABLE 3].  The high prices reflected the high 
capital costs and poor operating performance of nuclear power plants commissioned 
during the 1970s and 1980s, the high prices reflected in PURPA/QF contracts, and the 
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costs of excess capacity which got rolled into regulated prices.  The Massachusetts 
commission took the view, however, that it was “not the price of electricity that mattered 
but rather its global societal cost.” 
 
By 1990, least cost planning was the all the rage among state regulatory 
commissions and was spreading quickly from its origins in California, the Northeast and 
the Northwest.  And it is these policies that are heavily reflected in the Energy Policy Act 
of 1992 (see above).  As outlined earlier, EPAct92 has a large number of provisions to 
encourage energy efficiency, renewable energy, and integrated resource planning.  It also 
had two important provisions that would come to have profound effects on the structure 
of the electric power industry.  First, it gave FERC the authority to order utilities to 
provide wholesale transmission service to those requesting it, including the obligation to 
build new facilities to accommodate such requests.  Second, it amended PUHCA to 
exempt firms building independent power production facilities from its regulatory 
requirements and also relaxed restrictions on U.S. utility investments in foreign utilities.  
These provisions allowed any investor to build “Exempt Wholesale Generating” plants to 
supply utilities with power without running into conflict with PUHCA’s rules and 
without having to meet PURPA’s cogeneration and renewable energy rules.  It also 
opened up opportunities for U.S. utilities to invest in other countries and vice versa. 
 
Thus, the electricity provisions of the 1992 Act reflected environmental, 
independent power and energy marketer, and utility interests.  Environmental interests 
got the energy efficiency, renewable energy and integrated resource planning provisions 
of the Act.  Independent power producers and marketers, including utilities that were 
interested in expanding into these lines of business, got the transmission and PUHCA 
exemption provisions.  Other utilities thought that they got protection from losing their 
exclusive franchises to provide bundled service to retail consumers because the Act 
restricted FERC’s ability to order transmission service to support direct sales of power to 
retail consumers.   
 
B. FERC Takes the Lead 
Probably the most important contribution to the development of competitive 
wholesale and retail electricity markets made by the Administration was the appointment 
of a new set of FERC Commissioners who were committed to creating well-functioning 
competitive wholesale electricity markets and providing open non-discriminatory access 
to interstate transmission facilities to support the development of these markets.  It turned 
out as well that these Commissioners were willing and able to work closely with 
California and a few other states as they went further than Congress required or the 
Administration expected to restructure their utilities and to create competitive retail 
markets as well. 
 
Soon after the new FERC Commissioners were appointed, they proceeded 
aggressively to implement the wholesale transmission access provisions included in 
EPAct92.  The focus was on providing transmission access to utilities seeking to buy 
power from independent producers to serve their regulated retail customers franchises 
and independent producers seeking to sell power to them.  The basic model was one of 
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voluntary “wholesale competition” in which the local distribution company continued to 
act as the generation “portfolio” manager for retail consumers which the distribution 
company continued to serve exclusively in defined geographic areas at regulated cost-
based rates.  Purchasing power under contract from independent producers was now an 
alternative that utilities had to owning and operating their own power plants.  A growing 
number of state regulators required utilities to seek competitive bids for new generating 
capacity needs and either to buy power under the best contracts offered, rather than 
building themselves, or to use competitive market prices as a benchmark for determining 
the compensation they would receive if they did build new plants, rather than relying on 
traditional rate-base/cost of service regulatory mechanisms.  The expectation was that 
competitive bidding and competitive benchmark prices would provide more power 
incentives to control costs and increase operating performance than traditional cost of 
service regulation.  The transmission access and pricing rules promulgated by FERC 
were initially focused on facilitating these developments.  However, these early 
initiatives basically only required utilities to respond to transmission service requests on a 
case-by-case basis. Utilities were not required to file generic transmission tariffs that 
specified generally available transmission service offerings and associated maximum 
prices. Moreover, the nature of the transmission services that transmission owners were 
obligated to supply, and the associated prices, remained fairly vague, and utilities defined 
the kinds of transmission services and the pricing principles applicable to them in a 
variety of different ways.  Transmission service requests sometimes became lengthy and 
contentious negotiations. 
   
 Both FERC and transmission service customers became frustrated by the slow pace 
at which transmission service was being made available to support wholesale market 
transactions, and FERC continued to receive complaints about discriminatory terms and 
conditions (real or imagined) being offered by transmission owners.  Moreover, 
California’s electricity restructuring initiatives that began in April 1994 (more below) 
began to make it clear to FERC that its transmission access and pricing rules might have to 
support far more radical changes in the structure of the utility industry -- the functional 
separation of the generation of electricity from distribution service and the opening of retail 
electric service to competition -- and deal with a variety of new issues regarding state vs. 
federal jurisdiction over transmission, distribution, wholesale power sales and the treatment 
of  “above market” costs of generating capacity and QF contracts (what came to be called 
the “stranded cost” problem).   
 
 In 1995 these considerations led FERC to initiate rulemakings on transmission 
service that ultimately served as the basis for two major sets of new rules issued by FERC 
in 1996.  These rules are Order 888 -- “Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open 
Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission Service by Public Utilities; Recovery of 
Stranded Costs By Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities,”54 and Order 889 -- “Open 
Access Same-Time Information Systems.”55  These rules now serve as the primary 
                                                 
54 Final Rule issued April 24, 1999, 75 FERC  ¶ 61,080. 
 
55 Final Rule issued April 24, 1999, 75 FERC  ¶ 61,078. 
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federal foundation for providing transmission service, ancillary network support services, 
and information about the availability of these services to support both wholesale and 
retail competition in the supply of generating services.56   
 
 Order 888 requires all transmission owners to file with FERC pro-forma open 
access transmission tariffs that transmission service customers can rely upon to define the 
terms and conditions of transmission services that will be made available to them.  Order 
888 specifies the types of transmission services that must be made available, the 
maximum cost-based prices that can be charged for these services, the definition of 
available transmission capacity and how it should be allocated when there is excess 
demand for it, the specification of ancillary services that transmission owners must 
provide and the associated prices, requirements for reforms to power pooling 
arrangements to comply with Order 888, and  provisions for stranded cost recovery.  All 
transmission owners and power pools have now filed open access transmission tariffs 
with FERC. 
 
  Order 888 recognizes the sanctity of pre-existing commercial, contractual, and 
regulatory arrangements associated with the historical use of transmission systems and is 
generally sensitive to providing a smooth transition from the old regime to the new 
regime. Importantly, Order 888 establishes federal principles governing the recovery of 
stranded costs, -- which I will discuss in more detail presently.  For utility-owned 
generating plants, stranded or “strandable” costs are defined conceptually as the 
difference between the net book value of a generating plant used for setting cost-based 
regulated prices and the market value of that plant if it were required to sell it’s output in 
a competitive market.  For a QF contract, stranded costs are generally defined as the 
difference between the present value of the contractual payment obligations and the 
present value of the competitive market value of the electricity delivered under the 
contracts. FERC established the public policy case for allowing for stranded cost 
recovery in light of the long established regulatory rules in effect when the investments 
and contractual commitments were made and the public policy interest in facilitating 
restructuring and the creation of competitive wholesale power markets.57  
 
 While FERC’s position on stranded cost recovery was based primarily on its 
assessment of its legal obligations and equity considerations, it almost certainly reflected 
a set of more practical considerations as well.  Specifically, a major impediment to 
incumbent utilities’ going along with more fundamental changes in the competitive 
environment and cooperating in creating new transmission and wholesale market 
institutions necessary to support full wholesale and retail competition was their concern 
about stranded cost exposure.  FERC, and ultimately most state commissions that have 
considered the stranded cost issue, effectively sent utilities with stranded cost problems 
the following message: “Play ball by opening up your transmission and distribution 
                                                 
56 FERC Order 2000 regarding Regional Transmission Organizations issued in December 1999 is likely to 
become equally important.  Regional Transmission Organizations, 89 FERC ¶ 61,285 (1999). 
 
57 Verifiable stranded costs net of all reasonable mitigation options. 
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systems and by taking actions necessary to create competitive wholesale and retail 
markets quickly, and regulatory policy will treat requests for reasonable provisions for 
stranded cost recovery favorably.  Moreover, this deal may not be on the table forever.” 
 
 Order 888 did not attempt to resolve the problems created for transmission service 
customers by the large number of transmission owners, all operating under separate pro 
forma Order 888 tariffs, which existed in many regions of the country.  So, for example 
to make a trade between Indiana and Pennsylvania, a trader might still have to deal with 
several transmission owners to get a complete “contract path” from the generator 
supplying the power to the customer.  However, FERC subsequently issued a set of 
regulations which strongly encourage the creation of large Regional Transmission 
Organizations (RTO) to resolve problems created by the balkanized control of 
transmission networks and alleged discriminatory practices of generators and energy 
traders seeking to use the transmission networks of vertically integrated firms under 
Order 888 rules.58  The implementation details and effects of Order 2000 are yet to be 
determined. 
 
Order 889, issued at the same time as Order 888, requires each public utility or its 
agent (e.g. a power pool) that owns, controls, or operates facilities used for the 
transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce to create or participate in an Open 
Access Same-time Information System (OASIS).  This system must provide information, 
by electronic means, regarding available transmission capacity, prices, and other 
information that will enable transmission service customers to obtain open access non-
discriminatory transmission service in a time frame necessary to make effective use of 
the transmission system to support power transactions.  Order 889 also required public 
utilities to implement standards of conduct to functionally separate transmission and 
unregulated wholesale power merchant functions to ensure that a vertically integrated 
transmission owner’s wholesale market transactions are not advantaged by virtue of 
preferential access to information about the transmission network.  Utilities must also 
make the same terms (e.g. service price discounts) available to third parties as they do to 
their wholesale power marketing affiliates.   
 
C. California Takes Over the Lead 
FERC’s initial efforts to implement the transmission provisions of EPAct92 were 
based on the wholesale competition/utility-as-portfolio-manager model discussed above.  
Then something rather unexpected happened.   In the midst of the recession of the early 
1990s, which hit California and the Northeast especially hard as defense contractors and 
aerospace firms suffered from federal budget cuts, large industrial consumers revolted 
against the high electricity prices in these states.  The cost of generation service reflected 
in their regulated prices was 6 to 7 cents/Kwh (exclusive of T&D costs) while the 
wholesale price was about 2.5 cents/kWh.  Industrial customers in these states began to 
                                                 
58 Regional Transmission Organizations, 89 FERC ¶ 61,285 (1999).  Order 2000 technically makes 
participation in an RTO voluntary, but there are carrots and sticks available to FERC that will create 
significant pressure for utilities to join RTOs.  Order 2000 does not mandate a particular organizational 
form for an RTO, however. 
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agitate for the right to buy power directly in the wholesale market and to pay the utilities 
only for the costs of T&D service.  They were supported by independent power producers 
and energy marketers who emerged and matured with the earlier PURPA QF projects and 
the transformation of the natural gas industry.  The utilities generally opposed “retail 
competition” because it would “strand” the costs of investments and contracts entered 
into years ago under the assumption that oil would be $100/barrel rather than $20/barrel. 
 
In early 1993, the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) launched a 
comprehensive review of the structure and performance of California’s electricity 
industry. It was motivated primarily by pressure from industrial consumers to reduce 
electricity prices that were among the highest in the U.S.  High prices in turn were 
blamed on failures of the existing system of regulated vertically integrated monopolies:  
the high costs of nuclear power plant investments, expensive long-term contracts with 
independent power suppliers, excess generating capacity, costly and ineffective 
regulatory institutions.  There was broad agreement that the existing industry structure 
and regulatory system were seriously broken and needed to be fundamentally reformed. 
 
In April 1994, the CPUC articulated a reform program for the electricity sector.  It 
was built around a new industry structure in which the production of electricity from 
existing generating plants and the entry of new plants would be deregulated and their 
power sold in a new competitive wholesale market.  Retail consumers would have the 
choice of using the transmission and distribution wires of their local utility to obtain 
“direct access” to these new competitive wholesale markets or continuing to receive 
power from their local utility at prices reflecting the costs the utilities incurred to buy or 
produce it.  This vision for reform was heavily influenced by reforms implemented in 
Britain in 1990, where several CPUC commissioners and staff visited in early 1994. 
 
California’s well-funded interest groups then spent the next four years arguing 
about exactly how this reform vision would be implemented.  The new industry structure 
that eventually emerged from this contentious regulatory, legislative, and market design 
process was the most complicated electricity market ever created with many features that 
had never been tried before.  In an effort to appease various interest groups, the market 
design incorporated bits and pieces of alternative market models.59  The operation of the 
utilities’ transmission networks was turned over to a newly created non-profit 
Independent System Operator (ISO) which was responsible for managing the operation of 
the transmission network efficiently and reliably by relying on hourly spot markets for 
ancillary services and energy to balance supply and demand in real time.  It also relied on 
a number of annual supply contracts with generators with locational market power to 
ensure supply availability in transmission-constrained areas like San Francisco and San 
Diego.  A non-profit public Power Exchange (PX) was also created to operate a day-
ahead hourly energy market and (ultimately) markets for a number of longer term 
forward contracts.  Utilities were required to divest most of their fossil fueled generating 
plants and to buy and sell energy in the PX and ISO hourly spot markets.  Other load 
serving entities and power suppliers were free to enter into bilateral contracts and simply 
                                                 
59 See Joskow (2000), op. cit. for a more detailed discussion of California’s wholesale and retail market 
institutions. 
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submit schedules to the ISO.  The most complicated set of auction markets for energy and 
operating reserves ever created was developed to govern spot market trading managed by 
the PX and the ISO.   
 
It is inaccurate to characterize California’s electricity reforms as “deregulation.”  
The reforms are more properly viewed as “regulated competition.” Wholesale market 
prices were deregulated, but retail prices were fixed for up to four years.  The utilities 
were forced to sell their generating plants, in order to facilitate the creation of a truly 
competitive wholesale market and to value any prudent costs “stranded” by competition.  
But they also retained the obligation to buy power in the new wholesale market to 
provide service to retail consumers who did not choose a competitive retail supplier and 
to resell it to them at a fixed price regardless of its cost.  The CPUC rejected utility 
requests to meet their default retail supply obligations, accounting for 85% of demand, by 
negotiating fixed-price long-term contracts with power suppliers to hedge wholesale 
market price risks.  As a result, a large fraction of California’s electricity demand was 
being served through the utilities’ purchases in a volatile wholesale market; the utilities in 
turn were selling at a regulated fixed retail price and buying at an unregulated wholesale 
market price. Several knowledgeable people argued that there were numerous design 
flaws that would lead to problems once the wholesale markets began to operate. 
 
Importantly, the excess capacity situation that contributed to the pressures for 
reform in 1993 gradually disappeared as electricity demand grew and no new generating 
capacity was completed during the four-year period of uncertainty over the new rules of 
the game.  Once these rules were defined, developers quickly applied for permits to build 
many new power plants, only to confront a time consuming environmental review 
process and community opposition to power plants located near where they lived or 
worked.  This slowed the pace of investment in and completion of new power plants.  
The first of these new plants did not be on-line until Summer 2001. 
 
Subsequently, nearly two-dozen states decided to implement wholesale and retail 
competition reforms, though only about a dozen states have proceeded very far with the 
restructuring of their electricity industries. These states include five of the six New 
England states, New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Illinois.   Most of these 
“pioneer states” shared many attributes with California:  high retail rates, excess 
generating capacity, expensive nuclear plants and QF contracts, and angry industrial 
customers. [TABLE 4]  Nearly 100,000 Mw of utility generating capacity was divested 
to independent power suppliers, primarily affiliates of electric and gas utilities with 
franchises in other parts of the country, by utilities in these and other states from 1997 
though 2000.   Note that, so far, the state reform initiatives have proceeded with no new 
federal mandates or obligations beyond those included in EPAct92 and FERC wholesale 
power market and transmission regulations made under its existing legislative authority.  
 
D. The Administration Plays Catch-Up 
The DOE largely played catch-up with these developments during much of the 
decade.  Early in the administration the DOE’s policies focused on exploiting the 
institution of regulated monopoly to promote utility funding of renewable energy and 
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energy conservation options, whose costs were paid for in regulated retail prices.  The 
states that had pioneered these “integrated resource planning” programs also happened to 
be the pioneers on the restructuring and retail competition front.  As the debates about 
restructuring and retail competition spread across the country, interest in IRP and related 
programs evaporated.  The DOE tried to get back into the action by sponsoring a set of 
electricity policy forums, but DOE simply was never a major player on the electricity 
reform front.  It was not until April 15, 1999 that the Administration proposed 
comprehensive electricity restructuring and deregulation legislation.    
 
By trying to accommodate states rights interests, pressures from environmental 
groups to incorporate energy efficiency and renewable energy programs into federal 
“deregulation” legislation, pressures from utilities and independent power producers to 
repeal the Public Utility Holding Company Act (PUHCA) and PURPA, the 
Administration was slow in proposing comprehensive electricity reform legislation.  The 
legislation that it did propose in April 1999 had something for almost every interest group 
in it.  However, the legislation was opposed by several states, some vertically integrated 
utilities, and some consumer groups and broad support for the entire package was 
lacking.  It did not get very far in Congress.   
 
The primary features of the Administration’s proposed legislation were: 
 
1. Provided that all retail electricity consumers would be permitted to choose their 
power supplier (retail wheeling) and that local distribution companies would 
provide unbundled distribution and transmission service to allow them to do so by 
January 1, 2003 except if a state decided to opt out of this retail competition 
system. 
2. Clarifies FERC’s authority to order utilities to provide wholesale and retail 
transmission service, enshrines the provisions of Order 888 in federal law, and 
gives FERC authority to require the creation of independent regional system 
operators. 
3. Established a Public Benefits Fund that would disburse federal matching funds to 
participating states to provide subsidies to low-income consumers, energy 
efficiency programs, education and other programs.  The Fund would be financed 
by generators with a fee of up to 0.1 cents/kWh. 
4. Established a Federal Renewable Energy Portfolio Standard (RPS) which requires 
electricity retailers to include specified minimum percentages of designated 
renewable energy sources in their supply portfolios. 
5. Repeals the “must buy from QF” provisions of PURPA, while preserving existing 
QF contracts. 
6. Repeals the Public Utility Holding Company Act while expanding access to 
books and records of holding companies and affiliates for FERC and state 
regulatory authorities. 
7. Expands FERC’s authority to remedy market power problems in wholesale power 
markets. 
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8. Expands FERC’s authority to approve and oversee a national Electric Reliability 
Organization and Affiliated Regional Entities to prescribe and enforce mandatory 
reliability standards. 
9. Clarified the authority of EPA to require an interstate trading system for NOx 
reductions. 
10. Provisions for stranded cost recovery.  
 
Numerous other pieces of proposed restructuring legislation were filed in the House and 
the Senate during 1999 and 2000.60  Several of them included many of the key provisions 
of the Administration’s bill while others focused on a narrower set of issues: e.g. 
repealing PURPA, repealing PUHCA, transmission access, regional system operators and 
reliability issues. However, neither the Administration’s proposed legislation, nor 
competing legislation proposed by Republican Senators and Congressmen garnered 
sufficient support to come close to being passed by the Congress.   
 
 E.  California Runs into Major Problems61   
The new competitive wholesale and retail electricity markets began operating in 
April 1998.  Within a few months significant problems already began to emerge as a 
result of wholesale market design flaws and suppliers’ ability to exploit them.  Flaws 
were identified in the congestion management system, with the local reliability contracts, 
the protocols for planning and investment in transmission, with the real time balancing 
markets, in the ancillary services markets, and in other areas.  Within the first two years 
of operation, the ISO had filed 30 major revisions to its protocols with the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC).  The PX had filed for numerous changes in its 
operating protocols as well.  Responding to a never-ending series of problems and 
proposed fixes for them, FERC ordered the ISO to seek to identify and implement 
fundamental reforms rather than just piecemeal fixes to individual problems as they 
arose. The complex “Noah’s Ark” governance arrangements, with all major interest 
groups represented on the Board of the PX and ISO,  made agreement on any sensible 
reforms very difficult.  Moreover, because of California’s very difficult and time 
consuming regulatory process for getting siting and environmental approvals for new 
power plants, the anticipated flood of new generating capacity was being delayed, while 
demand continued to grow along with the economy. 
 
Despite these problems, competitive wholesale market prices for power were 
reasonably close to pre-reform projections, averaging 3 cents/kWh ($30/Mwh) between 
                                                 
60 Federal Restructuring Legislation 106th Congress, U.S. Department of Energy, 
http:www.eia.doe.gov/cnea…/page/restruct_bills/bill_sums_106.html, June 29, 2001. 
 
61 For a detailed discussion of California’s electricity market problems see Paul L. Joskow, “California’s 
Electricity Crisis,” July 2001, http://web.mit.edu/pjoskow/www/.  For an overview of the evolution of 
electricity restructuring and competition programs in the U.S. see Paul L. Joskow, “Deregulation and 
Regulatory Reform in the U.S. Electric Power Sector,” in Deregulation of Network Industries: The Next 
Steps (S. Peltzman and Clifford Winston, eds.), Brookings Press,  2000. 
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April 1998 and April 2000. [FIGURE 29]62 All things considered, prices were perhaps 
10% higher than they would be in a system without these design flaws.  In March 2000, 
the California Energy Commission published projections for wholesale market prices for 
2000 and beyond which were in the $30 to $35/Mwh range.63   Nevertheless, California’s 
new market arrangements were an accident waiting to happen.  And in mid-2000 the 
flawed wholesale market institutions and the partial deregulation program suddenly 
confronted a run of very bad luck. 
 
Wholesale prices began to rise above historical levels in May 2000 and stayed at 
extraordinary high levels for the rest of the Clinton Administration’s tenure.  As 
wholesale prices rose above the fixed retail prices that the utilities could charge their 
retail customers, they began to lose a lot of money.  The CPUC refused to raise retail 
prices to cover rising wholesale power costs until early January 2001, and the 1 cent/kWh 
surcharge approved was far too little to allow the utilities to cover either their ongoing 
wholesale power costs let along their past-due bills.  By December some suppliers had 
run up against their credit limits and stopped selling electricity to California electricity.  
In mid-January the utilities had run out of cash and stopped paying their bills for 
wholesale power.  At the Administration left office, the California electricity reform was 
in shambles as buyers had no credit and suppliers threatened to stop supplying. 
 
During the Administration’s final month in office the Secretary of Energy issued 
emergency orders to keep the lights from going out in California as credit problems led 
suppliers to withdraw supplies from the market.  The Secretary of the Treasury tried to 
facilitate a negotiated settlement with the Governor of California, California utilities, and 
the major independent generators and marketers.  His efforts were not successful.  The 
mess would be left for the new Bush Administration to deal with. 
 
The serious problems that emerged with the new market and regulatory 
arrangements in California during Summer 2000 cast a dark shadow over the electric 
utility restructuring and competition programs implemented during the Clinton years. 
These problems were at least partially a consequence of the failure of the federal 
government to articulate and promote a clear model for electricity sector restructuring 
and competition initiatives.  Instead, it accommodated a wide range of state approaches to 
restructuring and interest group concerns.  This “let a thousand flowers bloom” approach 
may have been politically convenient, but it led to an uncoordinated and sometimes 
incompatible and poorly design patchwork of state efforts to respond to interest group 
views on the appropriate directions for electricity restructuring and competition.  It is 
possible that the passage of the comprehensive federal restructuring legislation proposed 
by the Administration would have (eventually) improved the situation, largely by 
expanding and clarifying FERC’s authority in a number of important areas.  However, I 
                                                 
62 The prices reported in Figure 26 are average hourly day-ahead prices in the PX.  The PX went out of 
business at the end of January 2001.  The prices listed for February, March and April 2001 are the average 
prices paid by the ISO for real-time energy during those months. 
 
63 “Market Clearing Prices Under Alternative Resource Scenarios: 200-2010,” California Energy 
Commission, March 2000. 
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don’t think that the passage of the legislation in 1999 would have forestalled the 
problems in California.  The legislation does not specify a particular restructuring 
framework and does not deal with many important “details” that have led to problems in 
California and other states.   It would have taken FERC some time to develop a more 
comprehensive framework and to use its new authority to implement it.  Moreover, the 
state opt-out provision would have inevitably given the states a lot of discretion to 
proceed along their individual paths.  
 
VIII. COAL 
There were no major federal energy policies initiatives focused directly on the 
coal industry during the 1990s.  However, environmental policies, especially the Clean 
Air Act Amendments of 1990, enhanced enforcement of New Source review policies, 
carbon emissions policies, rail transportation policies, policies affecting the price of 
natural gas, and electric utility restructuring policies all have had and will continue to 
have important implications for the coal industry.  This is the case because (a) the 
combustion of coal produces more air pollutants and CO2 emissions than other fossil 
fuels per unit of useful energy and (b) coal accounts for over 50% of the electricity 
produced in the U.S.  
 
In 2000, coal accounted for 23% of the energy consumed in the U.S., slightly less 
than natural gas, about the same percentage as in 1990.  Over 90% of the coal produced 
in the United States is used to generate electricity.  Accordingly, developments in the coal 
sector are closely related to developments in the electricity sector.  During the 1990s, 
U.S. coal consumption increased slowly but steadily, growing 17% between 1990 and 
2000.64 [FIGURE 30].  The U.S. exported 5% to 10% of the coal produced each year 
during the 1990s. (Coal production declined slightly in 1999 and 2000 as exports fell.)  
Coal production continued to shift to the West of the Mississippi from the East of the 
Mississippi due to the low-sulfur content of Western coal, declining transportation costs 
(a benefit of railroad deregulation initiated in the 1980s), and falling real Western coal 
prices.  [FIGURE 31] In 1990, about 38% of U.S. coal was produced West of the 
Mississippi, while in 1999 nearly 50% was produced in the West.  Western coal has 
penetrated farther and farther to power plants in the East and Southeast as coal prices at 
the mine and coal transportation costs have declined.  The 1990 Clean Air Act provided 
additional stimulus to this continuing shift to Western Coal, but a lot of it can be 
accounted for by pure economics.65  Indeed, the flexibility provided for by the SO2 
allowance trading system created by the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 probably 
helped to sustain Eastern coal suppliers, especial those producing mid- and low-sulfur 
coals, more than would have been the case if alternative regulatory mechanisms had been 
adopted based on plant-specific emissions limits or emissions control technology 
requirements.   
 
                                                 
64 For a more detailed discussion see Richard Bronkowski, “The U.S. Coal Industry in the 1990s: Low 
Prices and Record Production,” Energy Information Administration (undated). 
 
65 Ellerman, Joskow, Schmalensee, Montero and Bailey, Markets for Clean Air:  The U.S. Acid Rain 
Program, Cambridge University Press, 2000. 
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 Most of the increase in coal consumption during the decade reflected increased 
utilization of the existing fleet of coal-fired power plants, many of which are now quite 
old.  Few new coal-fired generating plants were built or commissioned for construction 
during the 1990s and relatively little additional coal–fired generating capacity is planned 
for the next decade.  However, during the 1990s, coal plant owners learned how to 
operate older plants more efficiently and reliably and adopted maintenance, monitoring 
and control technologies that have significantly increased the economic life of these 
plants.  They adapted to the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments smoothly and efficiently.  
Barring major and costly new environmental restrictions on coal-fired power plants, most 
of the existing plants have going-forward costs that are less than the total costs of a new 
gas-fired CCGT.  These plants are likely to be economical to operate for many years into 
the future even if pre-2000 natural gas-price projections are realized.  Moreover, the 
recent increase in natural gas prices and the associated increases in wholesale electricity 
prices have led to announcements of several new coal plants, though natural-gas fired 
plants continue to dominate the fleet of planned new generating plants.66   
 
It is difficult to measure coal prices in a meaningful way due to heterogeneity in 
heat, sulfur and other mineral content, the prevalence of long term contracts negotiated at 
different points in time, and the continuing shift of coal production from the East to the 
West.  Ellerman, Stoker and Berndt show that real coal prices fell significantly in all 
producing regions during the 1990s, continuing a trend going back to the late 1970s.67    
Falling real coal prices reflected continuing increases in labor productivity, increases in 
total factor productivity, and economies of scale associated with a significant increase 
average mine size.68  Productivity improvements were greater in underground mines in 
the East, Midwest and West than in surface mines generally.69 The Energy Information 
Administration projects a continuing slow increase in coal consumption, a continuing 
shift of production to the West, and falling real coal prices for the next twenty years.70 
 
It became clear during the 1990s that the earlier assumption that older coal plants 
would be retired after 30 to 40 years of operation was no longer valid.  These plants have 
remained competitive even while significantly reducing emissions of criteria pollutants.  
                                                 
66 As of June 2001, there were only about 10-20 GW of new coal plants “planned” out of over 200 GW of 
total “planned” electric generating capacity. There are several data bases that report on “planned” 
generating plants and generating plants under construction.  There is significant variation in the numbers 
reported.  
 
67 D.A. Ellerman, T. Stoker, and E. Berndt, “Sources of Productivity Growth in the American Coal 
Industry,” MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research, March 1998.  Spot coal prices rose 
significantly beginning in the second half of 2000 and continuing into 2001, apparently in response to 
rising gas prices and a shift toward coal in electric generating plant dispatch.  See Richard F. Bonskowski, 
“U.S. Coal, Domestic and International Issues, Energy Information Administration, March 27, 2001.   
 
68 Ellerman, Stoker and Berndt, op. cit. 
 
69 Ellerman, Stoker and Berndt, op. cit. 
  
70 Annual Energy Outlook 2001, Energy Information Administration, December 2000, pages 92-95. 
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This realization appears to have motivated the New Source Review lawsuits brought by 
the EPA toward the end of the Administration’s second term --- an effort to impose costly 
cleanup requirements on older coal plants and to make these plants uneconomical to 
continue to operate.  Even if the tighter restrictions on criteria pollutants did not make 
these plants uneconomical, some in the EPA hoped that these restrictions would make it 
more likely that future CO2 emissions regulations would than have a bigger impact on 
coal-unit retirement decisions.  These suits and the general policies affecting older coal-
fired generating units bring to the fore the need to better harmonize energy, economic, 
national security and environmental policies.  
 
IX.   NUCLEAR ENERGY 
Nuclear power accounted for 20% of the electricity generated in the U.S. in 2000, 
down slightly from 21% in 1990.  Electricity supplied by nuclear plants increased by 
31%, despite the fact that the number of operating nuclear plants fell from 112 in 1990 to 
104 in 2000 and overall nuclear plant capacity declined by about 2% during the decade 
[FIGURE 32 and FIGURE 33].  The increase in nuclear electricity generation is 
accounted for entirely by a very significant increase in the availability of nuclear plants 
and their associated capacity utilization factors.71  Average plant capacity factors from 
66% in 1990 to 88% in 2000. [FIGURE 34] 
 
 U.S. policy toward the nuclear power industry during the 1990s was a policy of 
benign neglect, neither promoting new plant development nor seeking aggressively to 
close existing plants.  Indeed, although the Clinton administration was not a big booster 
of nuclear power, the industry flourished during the 1990.  A number of “pro-nuclear” 
actions were taken, including developing and applying re-licensing procedures for 
nuclear plants reaching the end of their initial license period,72 pre-certification of three 
new prototype plant designs, and support for continuation of a modest research program 
on advanced reactors.  After declining for several years, the FY2001 budget included a 
big increase for nuclear science.73  The Administration also continued to move the review 
process along for the future construction of a site for civilian nuclear waste at Yucca 
Mountain in Nevada, though the President vetoed a bill that would have formally 
designated this site for development. 
 
 At the beginning of the decade, the projections for the future of the U.S. nuclear 
power industry were gloomy. The last four nuclear plants that entered the construction 
pipeline in the 1980s were completed during the 1990s (2 in 1990, 1 in 1993, and 1 in 
1996).  No new nuclear plants have been announced since 1979.  Eleven nuclear plants 
were closed during the decade (all before 1998) because of poor operating performance 
and going-forward costs that exceeded current and projected wholesale market prices.  
                                                 
71 When nuclear plants are available to run they are almost always dispatched to supply electricity because 
their short run operating costs are very low and ramping them up and down is costly. 
 
72 The re-licensing of the Calvert-Cliffs plant in Maryland provided an important signal that there would 
not be insurmountable opposition to re-licensing from opponents of nuclear power. 
 
73 The proposed Bush administration budget for nuclear science and technology is, surprisingly, about 20% 
lower than the last Clinton administration budget for this line of business. 
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Early closure of additional nuclear units was predicted.  By the end of the decade the 
picture for the existing fleet of nuclear plants was much rosier.  There have been no plant 
closures since 1997 and several plants have applied for extensions of their original 
operating licenses. The rosier picture reflects the improved operating performance of the 
existing nuclear plants and the increase in wholesale market prices for electricity around 
the country.  The improved operating performance is at least partially the result of the 
restructuring of the electric power industry, facilitated by the Energy Policy Act of 1992, 
and the expansion of competitive wholesale power markets. 
 
 The restructuring of the electric power industry and the gradual deregulation of 
power production is having significant positive effects on the nuclear power sector.  
Ownership of nuclear plants is being consolidated through mergers of utilities with 
several operating nuclear plants (e.g. Philadelphia Electric (Exelon) + Commonwealth 
Electric (Unicom) in 2000) and through acquisitions of nuclear power plants being 
divested by their original owners by a small number of utilities with a commitment to 
assemble large fleets of nuclear plants spread around the country (e.g. Entergy and 
Dominion Resources).  Nuclear plants are increasingly subject to market-based pricing 
rather than cost plus pricing.  The consolidation of ownership of plants within companies 
with substantial nuclear operating experience and staff-expertise, combined with market-
based incentives have and should continue to lead to improvements in technical and 
economic performance of nuclear plants.  Of course, the NRC must continue to be 
vigilant about nuclear plant safety, but the trends on key safety-related indicators have 
also been excellent.    
 
The big question today is “will anyone ever build a new nuclear power plant 
again?”  While the existing fleet of nuclear plants is economical to operate based on 
market revenues and going-forward costs, it is far from clear that it is economical to incur 
the capital costs associated with building new nuclear plants which would sell output in 
competitive power markets, taking into account both market risks and regulatory/siting 
risks.  For new nuclear plants to be built to supply electricity in competitive wholesale 
markets, investors are likely to have to turn to new technologies which are less costly to 
build and are “inherently safe” to operate, as well as to overcome public resistance to the 
siting of nuclear plants near where they work and live.  The economics of investing in 
new nuclear plants will turn heavily of the future prices of fossil fuels, especially natural 
gas, and whether the U.S. adopts a policy that places a significant price on carbon 
emissions as part of a serious policy to control emissions of greenhouse gasses  
 
Proposals for new nuclear plants will also have to confront opposition resulting 
from the unresolved problem of disposal of high-level nuclear waste.74  Controversy on 
where interim and permanent high-level nuclear waste disposal sites would be located 
continued during the 1990s.  A waste disposal site for high-level nuclear waste has yet to 
be completed and it does not look like this will happen until after 2010.  The Nuclear 
Waste Policy Act of 1982 (plus 1987 amendments) required the DOE to take possession 
                                                 
74 For a good summary of the evolution of civilian nuclear fuel waste storage policies and programs See 
“National Nuclear Fuel Management Program,” and “National Program Implementation Timetable,” 
Nuclear Energy Institute, http://www.nei.org, November 26, 2000.   
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of and store spent nuclear fuel by January 1998.  Since 1982, electricity consumers have 
been making payments into a fund to a fund to pay for waste storage at the rate of 0.1 
cents per nuclear kWh produced.  Customer commitments plus interest now come to 
about $16 billion.  However, the federal government has defaulted on its waste disposal 
obligations and is potentially subject to financial penalties.   
 
The DOE was supposed to build a permanent deep, mined geological depository 
for high-level waste, an interim storage facility, and develop a transportation system to 
move spent fuel from power plants to interim and permanent storage sites.  An 
underground site at Yucca Mountain, about 100 miles from Las Vegas, was  identified for 
study (pursuant to 1987 amendments to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act).  While feasibility 
studies for the site have been completed, there has been continuous opposition to 
constructing it and moving spent fuel to it for storage.  In early 2000, Congress passed 
legislation that would have formally designated Yucca Mountain as the DOE’s official 
waste storage site with a target completion date of 2007.  However, President Clinton 
vetoed the bill.  No interim storage site has been designated either.  In 2001, DOE is 
scheduled to make it’s final site recommendation on Yucca Mountain.  If it recommends 
moving forward, the President would then decide whether or not to go forward.  If the 
State of Nevada objects to his decision, Congress would have to approve the site if it is to 
move forward.  The earliest date that the site would be completed and ready to accept 
spent fuel is now about 2010.  In the mean time, spent fuel is being stored on-site a 
nuclear plants (including plants that have been closed) around the country. 
 
 In 1995 and 1996, a controversy emerged over the privatization of the United 
States Enrichment Corporation (USEC), an initiative provided for (but not required) by 
the Energy Policy Act of 1992.75  Nuclear power plants use fuel with “lightly enriched 
uranium” (LEU).  Naturally occurring uranium has too little U235 to sustain a nuclear 
reaction.  In order to use uranium as a nuclear fuel, naturally occurring uranium must be 
“enriched” to a point where it contains 3.5% to 5%.  LEU cannot be used directly to 
make nuclear weapons.  Uranium-based nuclear weapons require highly enriched 
uranium (HEU), containing 90% U235.76  Historically, the federal government provided 
uranium enrichment services for civilian nuclear fuel (as well as for nuclear weapons) at 
plants owned by the Department of Energy.  Enrichment services are also provided by 
state-controlled enterprises in France, Russia and a European consortium, though U.S. 
utilities still rely on U.S. facilities for 75% of their enrichment services.  Utilities would 
                                                 
75 This discussion draws on Peter R. Orszag, “ Privatization of the U.S. Enrichment Corporation: An 
Economic Analysis,” (undated, but written prior to the privatization of USEC); “Commercial Nuclear Fuel 
From U.S. and Russian Surplus Defense Inventories:  Materials, Policies, and Market Effects,” Energy 
Information Administration, http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/nuclear/com_fuel/, March 11, 2001; “Nuclear 
Proliferation: Implications of the U.S. Purchase of Russian Highly Enriched Uranium,” U.S. General 
Accounting Office, December 2000; Richard Falkenrath, “Uranium Blues: Economic Interest vs. National 
Security,” The Milken Institute Review, 4th Quarter 2000. 
 
76 Plutonium produced in nuclear reactors can also be used to create nuclear weapons.  The disposition of 
stocks of plutonium reprocessed from civilian nuclear plants around the world also raises security issues. 
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deliver un-enriched uranium that they purchased from uranium suppliers77 to the DOE’s 
enrichment facilities and the DOE would then enrich the fuel and charge the utility for 
the enrichment services.  Roughly 2/3 of the cost of enriched uranium is for enrichment 
services and the other third for uranium ore concentrate and conversion to a form that can 
be enriched by the DOE’s gaseous diffusion process. 
 
 The Energy Policy Act of 1992 created the USEC as a wholly-owned government 
corporation to provide and market enrichment services from the DOE’s enrichment 
facilities in Ohio and Kentucky.  The DOE’s enrichment facilities were leased to USEC 
for a nominal feel and its stockpile of uranium was transferred to USEC as well.  The 
USEC Privatization Act of 1996 authorized the privatization of USEC.  The corporation 
was privatized in July 1998 through an IPO.   The IPO yielded $1.4 billion in proceeds, 
or about $14.50 per share of USEC, Inc. common stock.78  USEC competes with three 
foreign uranium enrichment entities, including a Russian and a French enrichment 
enterprise.  The primary motivations for privatization was to improve the efficiency of 
the operation of the enrichment program, to pursue the development of a new enrichment 
technology using lasers (AVLIS) on a commercial basis, and to raise money for the 
federal government.  
 
 The controversy over the privatization focused primarily on conflicts between the 
USEC’s commercial objectives and its responsibility to manage, without government 
subsidies, the 1993 “Megatons for Megawatts” agreement between the U.S. and Russian 
governments.  Under this agreement, the U.S. agreed to purchase 500 metric tons of 
Russian HEU that would be extracted from nuclear weapons and convert it to LEU 
civilian nuclear fuel.  Mechanically, the Russians extract the HEU as they dismantled 
their nuclear weapons and then “blend it down” with un-enriched uranium to create LEU 
suitable for civilian nuclear fuel.   The Russians were to be paid separately for the 
enrichment service (by USEC) and uranium components (by the ultimate purchasers) of 
the LEU, and the initial prices agreed to would have yielded about $12 billion to Russia.  
The USEC was the U.S. government’s exclusive agent for managing this agreement and 
continued in this role after it was privatized. 
 
 A potential conflict of interest arises because the Russian uranium was effectively 
a substitute source of enrichment services supplied from USEC’s plants.  There is a world 
market for enrichment services and the Russian LEU effectively reduced the world 
demand for enrichment services, further driving down prices in an industry that already 
had excess capacity.  Moreover, if USEC had to pay the Russians a price greater than the 
marginal cost of supplying enrichment services from their own facilities, it would 
necessarily have sacrificed profits.  Accordingly, USEC benefited commercially by 
paying lower prices for the enrichment component and was better off taking no Russian 
                                                 
77 For simplicity and I skip the interim conversion to UF6 and the subsequent fuel fabrication steps. 
 
78 “Privatization of the United States Enrichment Corporation,” Energy Information Administration, 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/nuclear/, March 11, 2001. USEC, Inc. also issued $500 million of bonds and 
the proceeds of the bond sale were turned over to the federal government as well.  
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LEU at any price greater than its marginal production cost.79  On the other hand, the 
objective of U.S. national security policy was to induce Russia to convert as much bomb 
grade HEU to LEU as possible, as quickly as possible, regardless of small changes in 
prices for enrichment services.  Since the commercial terms of the arrangement with the 
Russians had to be renegotiated from time to time, there was great concern that USEC 
would find it in its commercial interest either to reduce its purchases of Russian LEU or 
to undermine Russia’s enthusiasm for continuing with deliveries at the agreed upon pace, 
a result contrary to U.S. security goals. 
 
 As a commercial venture USEC has remained profitable, but has not been as 
successful as many had hoped.  Its revenues have declined and its stock has fallen from 
the IPO price of $14.50/share to a low of about $4.50/share, though it had recovered to 
$10/share by May 25, 2001.  It is closing its enrichment facilities in Ohio (raising 
concerns about domestic enrichment capabilities) and has abandoned development of the 
AVLIS technology.  USEC’s performance as the manager of the Russian HEU/LEU 
agreement has been the subject of considerable criticism80, though the HEU/LEU 
delivery schedule is not very far off target .81 
 
 It is clearly a mistake to privatize a firm that must operate in a competitive market 
and expect it successfully to pursue both commercial objectives as a publicly traded 
company and non-compensatory public interest goals.82  As Richard Posner observed 
many years ago, “taxation by regulation” only works if the firm providing the subsidies 
and cross subsidies is a regulated monopoly.  USEC is not a monopoly, its prices are not 
regulated, and it must compete with other suppliers to make sales of enrichment services.  
However, while critics have focused on privatization as being the policy error, it seems to 
me that the real policy error relates at least as much to the terms and conditions under 
which USEC managed the Russian program and the broader view that USEC would 
somehow pursue public policy goals that were not in its commercial interests.  The 
federal government could have structured the financial relationship so that USEC had 
more powerful incentives to meet or beat the HEU/LEU delivery schedule.  I suspect that 
the decision to keep the net costs of the deal with the Russian’s “off budget” led to a 
situation where USEC’s commercial interests and U.S. security interests were more likely 
to be in conflict.83 
                                                 
79 The Russians were not paid for the uranium component of the LEU until a buyer was found and then they 
received the market price for uranium.  Uranium prices were also falling during this period as a result of the 
Russian uranium sales as well as U.S. government sales of surplus defense HEU which was also to be 
converted to LEU. 
 
80 Orszag, op.cit. and Falkenrath op. cit. 
 
81 U.S. General Accounting Office, op. cit.  
 
82 The “market” that USEC was being privatized into was hardly a typical market for goods and services.  
There were only three other suppliers and they were all state-owned or controlled. 
 
83 There were other potential conflicts of interest that arose with the privatization of USEC, including 
conflicts arising with the government’s longer term goal of pursuing alternative enrichment technologies 
and continuing pressure to use USEC to support the U.S. uranium mining and conversion industry.  If the 
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IX. ENERGY EFFICIENCY, RENEWABLE ENERGY, AND ALTERNATIVE 
ENERGY POLICIES  
The term “energy efficiency” generally refers to a measure of the quantity of 
energy required to produce a unit of intermediate energy services --- heat, light, cooling, 
transportation, power to drive machinery, etc. --- and/or the quantity of energy services 
required to produce a unit of non-energy goods and services.  Energy efficiency and 
economic efficiency are not the same thing.  Energy efficiency measures focus on one set 
of productive inputs and rely on technical energy input/output indicia which do not take 
input costs and the value of output into account directly.  Economic efficiency takes all 
inputs into account along with their associated costs and the economic value of the goods 
and services they produce.  Increases in energy efficiency need not lead to increases in 
economic efficiency and vice-versa.  Advocates of policies to promote energy efficiency, 
however, typically argue that the programs they favor also improve economic efficiency.  
Either they lead to lower overall life-cycle costs for energy services taking all relevant 
private costs into account, or they reduce overall social costs once the costs of 
environmental externalities are factored into the equation.  However, the primary 
motivation of energy efficiency advocates has typically been improvements in 
environmental quality and/or reduced dependence on imported petroleum, not consumer 
protection. 
 
The term “renewable energy” generally refers to energy supplied by 
hydroelectric, wind, solar, wood, waste, geothermal energy resources, fuel cells, etc.  
These are energy resources which nature (or humans in the case of waste) can naturally 
reproduce as they are utilized to produce energy so that the resource base is not depleted  
(or is depleted very slowly)84 if it is managed properly.  The term “alternative fuels” is 
used in a variety of different ways.  It incorporates renewable energy, but also refers to 
policies which lead consumers to switch to fuels that reduce environmental impacts or 
reduce dependence on imported petroleum.  Advocates of policies to promote renewable 
and alternative energy resources, typically argue that the programs they favor also 
improve economic efficiency.  Again, either they lead to lower overall life-cycle costs for 
energy services taking all relevant private costs into account, or they reduce overall social 
costs once the costs of environmental externalities are factored into the equation.  
However, the primary motivation of renewable energy advocates is improvements in 
environmental quality and/or reduced dependence on imported petroleum. 
 
The case for government programs to promote energy efficiency, renewable 
energy and alternative fuels is often based on the argument that energy markets are 
plagued by a variety of market imperfections:  poor consumer information, imperfect 
capital and rental markets, regulated energy prices that are too low, the failure to 
internalize fully or properly environmental and national security externalities, and other 
                                                                                                                                                 
proponents of privatization believed that they could get the efficiency benefits from privatization while 
continuing to rely on USEC to pursue public policies that were not in its interest with no continuing federal 
budget impacts, they were wrong. 
   
84 Or in the case of solid waste, transforming it into useful energy saves on other costs that would be 
incurred to dispose of it. 
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market barriers.  That is, there is a proper role for government policies to promote energy 
efficiency, renewable energy and alternative fuels because market imperfections lead to 
under-investment in them.  Needless to say, the existence and importance of such market 
imperfections is controversial. 
 
A variety of policy instruments have been used to promote energy efficiency, 
renewable energy and alternative fuels.  These include vehicle, appliance and equipment 
energy efficiency standards, tax subsidies, government R&D expenditures, fuel-use 
mandates, and subsidies funneled through regulated gas and electric utilities and paid for 
in the prices they charge to consumers.  Federal policies supporting improvements in 
energy efficiency and expanded supplies of renewable energy are reflected in federal 
energy legislation beginning in the late 1970s.  As noted earlier, the Energy Policy Act of 
1992 has numerous provisions aimed at providing tax subsidies, R&D funding, and other 
forms of encouragement for energy efficiency and renewable energy.  Several states in 
the Northeast and West began to use their regulated monopoly electric utilities to 
stimulate investments in cogeneration, renewable energy, and energy efficiency during 
the 1980s.   
 
The Clinton administration’s appointments to the DOE in 1993 reflected the 
Clinton/Gore team’s strong interest in promoting renewable energy, energy efficiency, 
integrated resource planning, and recognizing the close linkages between energy 
production and use and environmental impacts in energy policy, including the impacts of 
CO2 emissions on global climate change.  Hazel O’Leary and her team of Assistant and 
Deputy Assistant Secretaries were a “green team” if there ever was one.   The instruments 
that the Clinton-era DOE had at its disposal from existing laws were limited, however.  It 
could seek authorizations to fund R&D, demonstration, and grant programs for energy 
efficiency, renewable energy, alternative energy projects.  It had opportunities to review 
and update appliance efficiency standards.  It could use moral suasion and federal grants 
to convince more states to adopt integrated resource planning programs to promote the 
use of regulated monopoly utilities to support energy efficiency and renewable energy 
programs.85  And within the restrictions imposed by existing laws, the Clinton DOE team 
tried to use these instruments to their fullest potential.  New appliance efficiency 
standards were eventually promulgated and expenditures on renewable energy and energy 
conservation programs increased.  However, no major new laws to promote energy 
efficiency, renewable energy or alternative were passed after 1992. 
 
The Clinton team’s efforts to move forward aggressively to promote energy 
efficiency, renewable energy, and alternative fuel vehicles was heavily constrained, 
however.  During the first several years, a significant constraint was the federal budget 
deficit and Congressional spending limits.  The DOE’s budget had been reduced during 
the previous decade and was under pressure at the beginning of the Clinton 
Administration.  Republican Senators continued to propose the DOE’s abolitions.  After 
                                                 
85 However, they had to play catch-up as the policy focus at the states quickly shifted from using the 
institution of regulated monopoly to subsidize energy efficiency and renewable energy projects to breaking 
them up and promoting competition. 
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1994, the Administration’s efforts to pursue its agenda were further hampered by the 
Republican Congress.  Beginning in 1995 (FY96), Congress included language in the 
Department of Transportation’s annual appropriations bills, forbidding it to even spend 
any money studying tightening the Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards (CAFE).  
Congress also placed roadblocks in the way of the Administration’s efforts to review and 
tighten appliance efficiency standards as provided for under existing laws.86  Although 
President Clinton vetoed a 1995 DOE appropriations bill that would have prohibited 
further DOE efforts to change appliance efficiency standards, the DOE proceeded 
cautiously afterwards, delaying the promulgation of new standards for several appliances 
until the very end of the second term. State programs to promote energy conservation and 
renewable energy which are funded through electric and gas utility rates increased 
significantly from 1990 to 1996 and then declined as state regulators turned their 
attention toward industry restructuring and competition.87 Finally, the Republican 
Congress rejected most Clinton administration proposals to create or increase tax 
subsidies for renewable energy technologies and alternative fuel vehicles.  
 
Despite these problems, the DOE gradually shifted funds toward renewable 
energy, energy efficiency, and alternative vehicle programs and, as budget surpluses 
appeared total funding expanded.  During FY 2001, the DOE received appropriations of 
about $2.2 billion for expenditures on “energy resources,” of which about $1.2 billion 
was allocated to energy efficiency, renewable energy and alternative fuel vehicles 
programs.88  Of this amount about 1/3 went to renewable energy and 2/3 to energy 
efficiency programs.  The FY 2001 budget included $540 million for fossil energy 
research and development.89  This sum includes $70 million of funding for fuel cells and 
carbon sequestration and about $200 million for research focused on improving thermal 
efficiency and reducing emissions from fossil fueled power plants.  Finally, about $240 
million was budgeted in FY 2001 for nuclear energy science and technology.90  Between 
FY 1996 and FY 2000, energy efficiency and renewable energy resource expenditures 
increased by about 50%, while expenditures on fossil and nuclear resource development 
declined by about 20%. There was a significant increase in fossil energy expenditures in 
                                                 
86 “House Conservatives Step Up Assault on Regulations,” Washington Post, July 19, 1995, Section A, 
page 4. 
 
87 Annual Energy Review 1999, page 228. 
 
88 The Bush administration’s budget proposes to cut expenditures in these areas by about 15% in FY 2002. 
 
89 I have excluded funds reported in the same line of business for the SPR and the federal power marketing 
agencies. 
 
90 An additional $34 million was appropriated for advanced particle accelerators in FY 2001.  Unpacking 
the DOE’s R&D budget is not easy. In FY2001, the DOE budget included about $7.7 billion of R&D 
expenditures.  However, this figure includes weapons-related research at the National labs, basic and 
applied science research funded through the DOE budget (e.g. nuclear physics, human genome research, 
computer science), and other items.  The nuclear science and technology research figure includes some 
funds that are pure research (e.g. university research reactors, medical research, etc.) Other departments 
also provide some support for related energy resource and conservation programs, but I have not tried to 
identify them. 
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FY 2001 and most of the proposed line item for “clean coal” technology in the proposed 
FY 2002 budget is a transfer from the FY 2001 fossil research budget. 
 
The Administration also embarked on cooperate programs with industry to 
develop new technologies.  The most important program involved cooperation between 
the federal government and the automobile industry to develop commercial technologies 
to increase automobile fuel efficiency, with a goal of commercializing vehicles that could 
get 80 miles to the gallon of gasoline.  
 
Energy Efficiency 
  The energy efficiency of the U.S. economy, as measured by energy consumption 
per dollar of real GDP continued to improve during the decade.  Energy consumption per 
dollar of real GDP declined by nearly 15% between 1990 and 2000.  However, it 
declined by 22% from 1980 to 1990, a period with significantly higher average energy 
prices.  Federal legislation to promote more energy efficient vehicles and appliances 
began to be passed in the 1970s and were enhanced during the 1980s and in EPAct92.   
 
There is little systematic objective evidence regarding the costs, benefits, and 
overall effectiveness of federal and state initiatives designed to improve energy 
efficiency.  No new energy efficiency legislation was passed during the 1990s. DOE 
continues to review and promulgate appliance efficiency standards pursuant to the 
National Appliance Energy Conservation Act of 1987 and the National Appliance Energy 
Conservation Amendments of 1988.  DOE claims that its appliance efficiency standards 
have reduced consumer energy expenditures by $2 billion per year.91  Appliances are 
clearly more energy efficient today than they were prior to 1987.  For example, a full size 
refrigerator uses about half the energy today than it did 20 years ago.92  The new 
efficiency standards proposed at the end of the Clinton administration would require 
washing machines to be 22% more energy efficient by 2004 and 35% more energy 
efficient by 2007.  Hot water heater efficiency is to increase by 8% for gas units and 4% 
for electric units by 2004.  The proposed rules would have required central air 
conditioners to be 30% more energy efficient by 2006.93  However, the cost-effectiveness 
and energy savings estimates attributed to federal appliance efficiency standards and state 
sponsored utility energy efficiency programs have been the subject of considerable 
controversy.  The costs and benefits associated with these initiatives programs have relied 
heavily on engineering estimates of costs and energy savings rather than actual field 
experience, fail to take into account all relevant costs, and ignore behavioral responses by 
consumers (e.g. purchasing larger refrigerators and air conditioners).94 
                                                 
91 http://www.eren.doe.gov/building/consumer_information/.  March 11, 2001. 
 
92 However, appliance choices also changed.  The fraction of households with central air conditioning 
increased by 21% and with personal computers 120% between 1990 and 1997. 
 
93 The Bush administration subsequently approved the first two new standards and reduced the central air 
conditioner standard to a 20% improvement in energy efficiency by 2006. 
 
94 Greening, L.A. and D.L. Greene, Energy Use, Technical Efficiency and the Rebound Effects: A Review of 
the Literature,” Report to the Office of Policy Analysis and International Affairs, U.S. Department of 
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  One contributor to the deterioration in the rate of decline in the energy intensity 
of the economy since the late 1980s is likely to be the relative trends in vehicle fuel 
economy.  Between 1980 and 1990, aggregate (passenger cars, light trucks, and trucks) 
average vehicle mileage for the then existing stock of vehicles increased by about 20%.  
Between 1990 and 1999 it increased by less than 4%.95 [FIGURE 35] The average fuel 
economy of new passenger cars and new light trucks (as measured by the EPA) has been 
essentially flat for the last 15 years.  Due to the shift toward SUVs, which are classified 
as light trucks and have lower average fuel economy than passenger cars, the average fuel 
economy of new light vehicles (passenger cars + light trucks) deteriorated by about 7% 
between 1988 and 2000.96  Sales of light trucks (including SUVs) now make up almost 
half of new vehicle sales, more than double their share 20 years ago. 
 
The Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 established Corporate Average 
Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards for each automaker, with domestically produced and 
imported vehicles counted as separate fleets.  For passenger cars, the CAFE standards 
started at 18 miles per gallon with the 1978 model year and gradually increased to 27.5 
miles per gallon for the 1985 model year.   For light trucks, including SUVs, the CAFE 
standard began at 17.2 miles per gallon in 1979 and rose to 20.5 miles per gallon by 
1987.  These standards are based on laboratory tests and have not changed since 1985 and 
1987 respectively.  Actual vehicle mileage has continued to improve, at a declining rate, 
since then as new cars replaced older vehicles from model years with lower CAFE 
standards.   
 
The effects of the CAFE standards on vehicle efficiency and utilization, and the 
merits compared to alternative instruments (e.g. gasoline taxes), have been the subject of 
                                                                                                                                                 
Energy, Washington, D.C., December 1997;  Greene, D.L. et. al., “Fuel Economy Rebound Effects for U.S. 
Household Vehicles,” The Energy Journal, Vol. 20, No. 3, 1999;  J. Eto. et.al. “Where Did All the Money 
Go? The Cost and Performance of the Largest Commercial Sector DSM Programs,” The Energy Journal, 
Vol. 21, No. 2, 2000;  F. Wirl, “Lessons from Utility Conservation Programs,” The Energy Journal, Vol. 
21, No. 1, 2000. 
 
95 There are a variety of different data on vehicle fuel economy that are available.  The Energy Information 
Agency produces estimates of actual average mileage achieved by vehicles in operation each year.  These 
are the numbers used for the calculation in this sentence.  The Department of Transportation (DOT) and 
EPA publish estimates of the mileage for new “model year” vehicles in various categories.  These data are 
based on laboratory tests, not actual driving experience.  The DOT and EPA numbers also differ slightly 
from one another because the DOT incorporates other factors (e.g. ethanol credits) into the mileage 
calculations that are related to the agency’s enforcement responsibilities.  These mileage numbers are 
higher than the actual mileage achieved by new vehicles in each model year, the mileage reported on the 
stickers on the windows of new vehicles, and the actual mileage of the current stock of vehicles which 
includes vehicles from a large number of model years.  For example, DOT reported that the average fuel 
economy for 1999 Model Year passenger cars was 28.3 miles per gallon.  EIA reports actual vehicle 
mileage of 21.4 miles per gallon in 1999 for the entire fleet of operating passenger cars.   
 
96 The data in the last two sentences are based on the EPA’s “new model” mileage data discussed in the 
previous footnote.  See “Automotive Fuel Economy Program, National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration, http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/cars/problems/studies/fuelecon/index.html and Light-Duty 
Automotive Technology and Fuel Economy Trends 1975 through 2000, U.S. EPA, December 2000.  
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much study and remains a subject of considerable controversy.97  Efforts to tighten the 
CAFE standards have been opposed by domestic automobile manufacturers for the last 
two decades.   Since the standards were phased in during a time of rising gasoline prices, 
some studies suggest that vehicle mileage would have improved significantly without the 
standards.  Other studies suggest that the shift to light trucks (SUVs) is partially 
explained by the more lenient mileage standards applicable to these vehicles, though 
changes in consumer preferences and incomes are a more likely explanation.  Still other 
studies find that the improvements in fuel efficiency has led to an increase in miles driven 
(the so-called “rebound effect”), reducing the impact of the standards on gasoline 
consumption.  Finally, studies have suggested that when manufacturers reduced vehicle 
weights to increase mileage, this led to an increase in the severity of accidents and 
increased accident mortality.98  
 
There are several things that are fairly clear about the CAFE standards.  First, they 
have almost certainly been binding constraints on domestic automobile manufacturers 
since the mid-1980s as gasoline prices fell.  Second, the efficiency of the CAFE standards 
could be substantially improved if manufacturers could trade mileage “credits” among 
one another and the “two-fleet” average rules were eliminated.  Third, special credits for 
alternative fuel capabilities (i.e. ethanol) are ineffective in promoting use of alternative 
fuels.  Fourth, EPA automobile emissions regulations are constraining the diffusion of 
diesel-fueled vehicles with higher mileage.  Finally, cost effective improvements in 
automobile mileage appear to be available with new technology, but stimulating 
consumer interest in fuel economy continues to be a major challenge.  The National 
Academy of Sciences is now conducting a study of the CAFE standards and their effects.  
That report is expected to be released during the summer of 2001. 
 
Renewable Energy and Alternative Fuel Vehicles 
 In 2000, renewable energy, including conventional hydroelectric energy, 
accounted for 7% of U.S. energy consumption, about the same fraction as in 1990. 
Excluding conventional hydro, renewable energy accounted for 3.7% of total U.S. energy 
consumption in 2000, only slightly higher than in 1990.  Most of the non-hydro 
renewable energy is accounted for by wood, waste, and alcohol fuels.  Wind and solar 
energy accounted for only 0.1% of total U.S. energy consumption in 2000, though wind 
energy supplies did grow quickly during the decade from (and to) a very low base. 
[FIGURE 36] 
                                                 
97 P.K. Goldberg, “The Effects of the Corporate Average Fuel Efficiency Standard in the U.S.,” The 
Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. XLVI, No. 1, March 1998; R.W. Crandall and J. Graham, “The 
Effects of Fuel Economy Standards on Automobile Safety,” Journal of Law and Economics,  Vol. 32, No. 
1, 1989; J. Mayo and J. Mathis,” “The Effectiveness of Mandatory Fuel Efficiency Standards in Reducing 
the Demand for Gasoline,” Applied Economics, Vol. 20, No. 2, 1988; R.W. Crandall, “The Changing 
Rationale for Motor Vehicle Fuel-Economy Regulation,” Regulation, Vol. 13, No. 3, Fall 1990; T. 
Bresnahan and D. Yao, “The Non-pecuniary Costs of Automobile Emissions Standards,” Rand Journal of 
Economics, Vol 16, 1985;  D. L. Greene, et. al., “Fuel Economy Rebound Effect for U.S. Household 
Vehicles,” The Energy Journal, Vol. 20, No. 3, 1999. 
 
98Vehicle performance (e.g. acceleration) probably suffered as well during the first decade of experience 
with the CAFE  standards, as manufacturers responded by reducing engine horsepower. 
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 There were about 400,000 alternative fuel vehicles, mostly light trucks and buses, 
in operation in 1999. [FIGURE 37] Most of these vehicles use liquid petroleum gas or 
compressed natural gas.  There were only about 6,500 electric vehicles in operation in 
1999.  While alternative fuel vehicles represent a tiny fraction of the vehicles on the road, 
the number of alternative fuel vehicles nearly doubled during the decade. 
   
 Despite all of the rhetoric about energy efficiency and renewable energy, and the 
efforts of the DOE to shift funds to develop and promote more energy efficiency and 
renewable energy, these initiatives had little if any effect on trends in energy supply and 
demand during the 1990s.  This should not be surprising.  The primary change in policy 
from the previous decade was to shift fairly modest amounts of DOE money toward 
development of new energy-using and renewable energy technologies. To the extent that 
these efforts have any significant effects, they will only be realized over a significant 
future period of time.  The Clinton administration continued to tighten appliance 
efficiency standards pursuant to existing laws, but the impact of new standards are not 
applicable to new appliances for several years after they are finalized and once they are in 
effect the impacts on aggregate energy use are realized only gradually over time as the 
appliance stock turns over. 
 
X. CONCLUSIONS 
 Overall, the decade of the 1990s was a period in which energy markets performed 
reasonably well, federal energy policymakers focused primarily on implementing and 
completing policy initiatives that began before or at the very beginning of the decade, and 
the energy supply sectors evolved slowly and relatively smoothly.  The overall fuel 
supply mix that satisfied growing energy demand changed very little between 1990 and 
2000.  Aside from the “energy crises,” which were not nearly of the magnitude of those 
of the 1970s, at the very beginning and very end of the period examined here, energy 
supply was able to expand easily to meet growing demand and to support a rapidly 
growing economy without triggering significant sustained price increases or supply 
disruptions.  Real energy prices were stable or falling for most of the period and there 
were significant productivity improvements in several energy sectors.  The performance 
of the nuclear energy and coal sectors was especially impressive in terms of continuous 
performance improvement.  It was simply not a decade where there was much public 
interest in energy policy issues. 
 
The restructuring of the natural gas industry was largely completed and the 
restructuring of the electricity sector proceeded at a much faster pace than could have 
been predicted at the beginning the decade. Until 2000, electricity restructuring initiatives 
begun in California and the Northeast appeared to be going sufficiently well that similar 
reforms were diffusing fairly quickly among the states without any federal legislation to 
push states to consider and adopt major reforms.   Responsible federal agencies worked 
cooperatively with states pursuing diverse electricity policy strategies in an effort to 
ensure that complementary federal policies on transmission access and wholesale power 
markets supported the state restructuring and retail competition initiatives.   
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The energy intensity of the economy continued to decrease and there was a 
gradual increase in the penetration of relatively clean natural gas in the production of 
electricity during the decade, with a large fleet of CCGTs in the construction and 
planning pipeline.  The federal government slowly continued to tighten appliance 
efficiency standards and to increase federal funds devoted to the development and 
deployment of more energy efficient appliances, vehicles, and technologies, as well as 
renewable energy and alternative fueled vehicles.  However, the visible impacts of these 
programs to date are very small.  The energy industries were able to adapt reasonably 
well to the requirements of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 and the Clinton 
administration clearly recognized and took account of the close relationships between 
energy and environmental policies.  There was little interest among voters in energy 
problems until the very end of the decade and this is reflected as well in the very modest 
amount of legislative activity on the national energy policy front. 
 
 The good performance of energy markets during the seven or eight years 
following the Gulf war is likely to have masked a number of continuing and emerging 
energy policy challenges which derive from higher order domestic and foreign policy 
issues discussed at the beginning of this essay.  The changes in world oil, domestic 
natural gas, and electricity markets in 1999 and especially 2000 likely reflect the impacts 
of ignoring some of these challenges.  I want to conclude this essay by identifying and 
briefly discussing a few energy policy challenges which I believe should be high on the 
policy agenda for this decade. 
 
1. Energy supply infrastructure, “reserve” capacity, and market volatility:  By the end of 
the decade the energy supply infrastructure was being stressed in most of the energy 
sectors, reflecting the end of a decade in which demand grew faster than did 
infrastructure capacity.  This is certainly the case with regard to the generation and 
transmission of electricity, the production and transportation of coal, the refining of 
oil, and in some areas the transportation and storage of natural gas.  The tightening 
infrastructure situation reflects, in part, the fact that the decade began with excess 
capacity in several of these sectors and as demand grew it naturally utilized existing 
capacity more fully before major new investments were economical.  Moreover, as 
prices have risen in the last couple of years, there has been a significant supply 
response, though there are necessarily lags between project identification, 
construction and operation.   
 
However, I believe that the current tight supply situation reflects more than simply a 
traditional adjustment of supply to demand.  Major changes took place in important 
infrastructure segments during the 1990s which are likely to make supplies tighter on 
average in the future than we have experienced in the recent past; these changes are 
leading to more reliance on the equivalent of “just in time” manufacturing by energy 
suppliers than was the case in the past.  They are likely to lead energy industries to 
carry less “reserve capacity” and to be more vulnerable to supply and demand shocks 
with attendant increases in price volatility.  Moreover, because the 1990s was a 
decade in which significant increases in demand could be accommodated without 
major expansions of energy infrastructure facilities in several sectors, we have been 
 59 
able to avoid resolving conflicts between the need to get approvals to site and develop 
major new infrastructure facilities and federal, state and local siting and 
environmental policies which, at the very least, make it costly and time consuming to 
obtain necessary government approvals.  These siting issues can no longer be 
avoided. 
 
Before the 1990s, electric utilities engaged in long-term (10 year) planning to meet 
the projected needs of their customers with a high level of reliability.  They had legal 
obligations and economic incentives to build facilities or to contract for capacity built 
by others long before it was expected to be needed and to build a significant reserve 
margin into their plans.  The long-term planning process included time to work with 
federal, state and local authorities to obtain siting and environmental permits.  If 
traditional regulatory process was good at anything it was good at mobilizing capital 
and ensuring that there was plenty of capacity in place to meet projected demand.  
Indeed, one of the major criticisms made of traditional regulatory institutions is that 
they led regulated electric utilities to build too much generating and transmission 
capacity, with the associated costs being passed along eventually to consumers in the 
prices they paid for electricity.  When utilities built new power plants in the old days 
they typically also entered into long-term contracts (or through vertical integration) 
for coal, natural gas, and transportation services to ensure that they had the fuel to run 
the plants.  Coal, natural gas, and pipeline companies then used these contracts as 
security to obtain financing and regulatory approvals for the new facilities on the 
time-line consistent with utilities’ long planning horizons.  Accordingly, reserve 
capacity created by the electric utility industry worked its way back into reserve 
capacity in fuel and transportation sectors as well. 
 
Similarly, in the natural gas industry, gas production, transportation, distribution and 
consumption were linked together by a web of actual or implicit long-term contracts.  
Indeed, federal regulators would not even permit an interstate pipeline to be built 
unless the developer could show that it had lined up adequate gas supplies at one end 
of the pipeline and secured contracts with LDCs at the other end of the pipeline to 
secure the long-term “need” for the pipeline.   The reforms in the natural gas industry 
which have evolved over the last fifteen years have changed the nature of contractual 
arrangements between entities at the different vertical levels of the production chain.  
Contractual commitments are generally shorter and the contracting parties more 
diverse.  There is much more reliance on short-term market arrangements than was 
the case in the past and more market risk has been shifted to pipeline companies.  
LDCs tend now to have much shorter-term contracts as do (effectively) end-use 
customers that no longer rely on the pipeline or LDC to arrange for their gas supplies. 
 
Even in the petroleum industry, which has never been governed by the kinds of 
regulatory institutions applied to electricity and gas pipelines, refining capacity 
declined as regulations supporting small refiners disappeared.  Refinery utilization 
has increased to almost 100%.  Moreover, the industry seems to be operating 
“leaner,” maintaining smaller stocks of products than in the past.  Effective reserve 
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capacity has been reduced further by the proliferation of more differentiated gasoline 
product compositions required by local environmental regulations.   
 
Since one of the problems that restructuring and regulatory reforms in these industries 
was designed to fix was their tendency to carry too much capacity, the clear trend to 
carry much less reserve capacity and for investments to reflect shorter planning 
horizons may properly be viewed as a benefit of these reforms.  However, this benefit 
is not without at least some cost in terms of increased market volatility resulting from 
less capability to respond to swings in supply and demand without large price 
movements.  The new regime may represent a more efficient balancing of these costs 
and benefits, but the consequences do not seem to me to be fully understood by 
policymakers or the public.  Moreover, remaining imperfections in market design and 
regulatory institutions, especially in the electricity sector, may very well lead to 
under-investment, especially in transmission infrastructure, and to too little reserve 
generating capacity to match consumer preferences.  Under-investment in electricity 
infrastructure and other regulatory and market design imperfections then have 
implications for timely investments in coal and natural gas infrastructure as well. 
 
2. Electricity sector restructuring is incomplete, balkanized, and suffers from serious 
market design and regulatory imperfections:  The restructuring of the electricity 
sector has been driven by individual state initiatives affecting an industry which 
physically and economically is increasingly organized (or should be organized) 
around wholesale energy and transmission markets covering large geographic areas 
encompassing many states.  Federal policies have taken a “let a thousand flowers 
bloom” approach and federal policy makers have cheerfully pointed to electricity 
sector reform as an example of “cooperative federalism” where policy reforms are 
benefiting from the “50 laboratories of democracy” that characterize our federal 
system.   This sounds very nice and there is certainly something to it.  However, in 
my view the electricity sector reform program is in trouble and needs more attention 
and direction at a national level.  The “thousand flowers bloom” approach reflects 
more the absence of political backbone and weak political support for comprehensive 
restructuring than it does sensible electricity policy. 
 
At the present time, a relatively small number of states in the Northeast, California 
and Illinois have gone through comprehensive electricity reform programs.  These 
states have adopted the “standard prescription” for electricity sector reform.  The 
“standard prescription” involves separating competitive segments (generation and 
retailing) from segments that will continue to be regulated monopolies (distribution, 
network operations, and at least partially transmission).  Many other states have done 
nothing or have introduced some competition without compatible structural reforms.  
While California has attracted the most attention, many of the other “pioneer states” 
have also encountered various less visible problems.  Retail competition initiatives 
have generally been a failure, wholesale market design is a continuing work in 
progress, market and policy uncertainty is delaying investments in new generating 
plants, the expected diffusion of real time pricing and demand management has not 
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materialized,99 siting and environmental policies are only slowly adapting to 
competitive markets, and the framework governing transmission access, pricing and 
investment is at best incomplete and at worst completely dysfunctional.  The buffer 
provided by excess capacity is now largely used up and the imperfections are 
showing up as increasing retail electricity prices, declining reserve margins, declining 
availability statistics, and more inefficient generator utilization. 
 
In my view, the U.S. needs a comprehensive set of federal electricity policies 
governing industry structure, wholesale market design, regional transmission 
ownership and network operating institutions, and options for arranging power 
supplies for retail consumers.  Continuing to rely on the current mix of federal and 
state jurisdictions, the absence of a clear model that these reforms should follow, and 
a federal regulatory agency (FERC) whose skills, legal authority and procedures are 
poorly matched to presiding over the creation of competitive electricity markets with 
good performance attributes is not going to lead to a good result.  Succeeding in 
making the electricity restructuring and competition program work well is not going 
to be easy.  It requires dealing with difficult issues of states’ rights, powerful utility 
and energy marketing companies with private interests that may diverge from the 
public interest, and consumers and their representatives in many states who think that 
the old system worked just fine.  Several pieces of the comprehensive electricity 
legislation proposed by the Clinton administration in 1999 should be part of a new 
legislative initiative.   
 
3. Dependence on imported petroleum is growing:100 If one believes that U.S./G8 
dependence on imported petroleum creates national economic and defense security 
problems whose costs are not fully internalized, then the 1990s may not look like it 
was a good decade at all.101  U.S. oil imports increased substantially and imports grew 
in other G8 countries as well.  While world oil production remains less concentrated 
in the Persian Gulf than was the case in 1973, world crude oil reserves available to 
support exports are concentrated in the Middle East and North Africa.  Current 
forecasts indicate that the U.S. petroleum imports will continue to grow as a fraction 
of domestic consumption in the future.  It is not credible to believe that realistic 
domestic supply-side initiatives will significantly alter these trends, even if policies to 
expand drilling opportunities on federal lands are adopted.  Moreover, while plausible 
demand-side policies aimed at improving vehicle efficiency, as well as new cost-
effective technologies that will make their way into the market without new 
regulations, may slow the rate of growth in gasoline consumption and imports, even 
                                                 
99 Indeed, real time pricing and demand management innovations have been most apparent in states which 
have not restructured their electricity industries and have not introduced retail competition programs. 
 
100 I offer these observations as an observer rather than as an expert on national security issues. 
 
101 It is important to note, however, that the U.S. economy is less dependent on petroleum than it was 
during the 1970s, the U.S. and other oil importing countries are less dependent on Middle Eastern oil,  and 
that we seem to better understand how to use monetary policy to manage the macroeconomic effects of oil 
shocks. 
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under the most optimistic credible) assumptions about cost-effective improvements in 
vehicle fuel efficiency, it will be a long time before gasoline consumption actually 
starts to decline.102   Accordingly, growing dependence on imported oil looks like it is 
something that we are going to have to live with for a long time, so our foreign and 
domestic policies will need to adapt to this reality. 
 
4. Energy and environmental policies can be better coordinated:   It is quite clear to me 
that many of the Clinton administration’s energy policies were driven, by design or 
default, by its environmental goals.  It would make sense to recognize the 
fundamental interdependence between energy and environmental policies and 
coordinate them more effectively.  If and when the U.S. implements a serious 
program to control carbon emissions, close coordination between energy and 
environmental policies will be even more important.  One issue that deserves 
immediate attention involves older coal-fired power plants that were built before the 
New Source Performance Standards were adopted.  The NSPS standards do not apply 
to these plants unless investments in generating unit upgrades lead the units to cross 
an uncertain line that triggers their applicability.  The rationale for exempting these 
plants from NSPS was the expectation that the plants would be retired in due course.  
It is now clear that many of these plants can continue to operate economically for 
many years into the future as long as additional investments in maintenance, 
replacement equipment, and modern boiler and turbine monitoring and control 
equipment are made.   
 
From an energy policy perspective it doesn’t make much sense to discourage owners 
of coal-fired power plants from investing in efficiency and reliability improvements 
or life-extensions which are economical.  On the other hand, from an environmental 
policy perspective it doesn’t make much sense to permanently apply different 
environmental standards to old plants than to new plants.  This could make plant 
enhancements economical only because they allow the owner to avoid current 
environmental standards applicable to new plants.  A solution to this policy conflict is 
to adopt more flexible environmental policies that integrate old and new sources, but 
do not apply specific uniform emissions requirements to all plants.  The cap and trade 
program created by the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 provide a successful 
example of how economic mechanisms can be used to harmonize emissions 
restrictions applicable to all sources producing the same product (electricity in this 
case) while giving individual sources the flexibility to adapt to emissions constraints 
in the most cost effective ways.  Expanding this kind of mechanism to NOx and other 
pollutants and potentially to CO2 emissions would help to better integrate energy and 
environmental policies goals. 
  
5.  We need to re-evaluate policies toward nuclear power:  The 1990s were an especially 
good decade for nuclear energy.  The U.S. nuclear industry has finally learned how to 
operate the existing fleet of nuclear plants economically and safely.  Moreover, their 
                                                 
102The reasons are (a) that projections are that miles driven will continue to grow,  (b) it takes a long time 
for the vehicle stock to turn over, (c) new more fuel efficient technologies will be introduced into new 
vehicles gradually over the next decade.  
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improved performance during the 1990s helped to reduce air emissions, since if they 
had not improved their capacity factors, electricity supplied from older fossil plants 
would have been the substitute sources of electricity.  Existing nuclear power plants 
increasingly have to sing for their supper, in the sense that they must cover their 
going forward costs based on the market value of the electricity they produce.  Plants 
that can’t make it economically will continue to close.  Those that can should 
continue to be given the opportunity for extending their operating licenses. 
 
While nuclear plants do not produce SO2, NOx, CO2, etc., they do produce long-lived 
nuclear waste.  It is now accumulating primarily in storage ponds on nuclear plant 
sites.  This is not a long-term solution to the waste problem.  The federal government 
has defaulted on its commitment to take back the waste and store it safely.  It’s time 
for the federal government to make a more concerted effort to license, construct and 
begin operating a waste fuel depository. 
 
Whether or not it will prove to be profitable for a developer to build a new merchant 
nuclear plant that will sell its output in competitive wholesale electricity markets is 
very uncertain, perhaps even doubtful.  However, for the first time in nearly two 
decades, a few generating companies are talking seriously about the possibility of 
making investments in new nuclear plants, and without the security of cost-based 
regulation.  At the very least, policies should be adopted to ensure that unnecessarily 
burdensome federal licensing and state siting regulations do not represent a barrier to 
making these investments if investors are willing to take on the ordinary electricity 
market risks associated with construction and operating costs and plant performance.  
It may even make sense to provide some financial support for one or more new plants 
in order to refine federal and state licensing and siting regulations.   The NRC has not 
been asked to license a (real) new plant in many years.  It would be useful to 
demonstrate to potential future investors in nuclear projects whether or not the 
licensing process represents an insurmountable barrier to profitable private 
investments in new nuclear power plants in the U.S. 
 
6. We need to reevaluate and perhaps refocus energy efficiency and demand-side 
management programs:  When the Energy Policy Act of 1992 was passed, energy 
efficiency advocates expected that electric and gas utility “DSM” programs would 
provide an important platform for introducing and diffusing more energy efficient 
lighting, appliances, equipment, and building standards, using revenues collected out 
of regulated retail gas and electricity rates to finance the costs of the programs, 
including subsidies given to consumers to induce them to adopt approved equipment. 
These initiatives were to be and have been supported by DOE’s energy efficiency and 
renewable R&D and deployment initiatives.  While these programs have not 
disappeared with the changes affecting the electric power and natural gas industries, 
the funding available through utilities has been reduced and the effectiveness of the 
programs become more uncertain, especially in states where industry restructuring 
initiatives  have taken distribution utilities out of the “retail” business.   
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I have felt for many years that the energy and economic savings attributed to these 
programs have been overstated, that many of them were poorly designed, and that 
program performance was poorly monitored and evaluated.  Moreover, they have not 
been as successful as many had hoped in “jump starting” more rapid market diffusion 
of the energy efficient appliances and equipment they have promoted.   Nevertheless, 
it is clear even to me that there are a number of energy efficiency opportunities that 
clearly are both economical for consumers and can save significant amounts of 
energy (though less than is often claimed).  There continue to be market barriers to 
their diffusion, but the nature of these barriers and how they can be reduced are not 
well understood.  There appears, on paper, to be a lot of low-hanging fruit.  The 
challenge is to induce consumers or their agents to pick it efficiently. 
 
I would like to see more attention paid to identifying the nature of the market barriers 
that significantly slow diffusion of more efficient appliances, buildings and 
equipment and more research on the strengths and weaknesses of alternative 
mechanisms to reduce them. (More marketing experts and fewer economists and 
engineers are needed.)  I would also like to see more rigorous and complete 
evaluations done of the costs and benefits of energy efficient technologies based on 
actual experience with real people in real homes and businesses, not engineering 
calculations of energy savings and costs.  Finally, deployment and third-party funding 
programs need to adapt to the changes taking place in the electricity and natural gas 
industries, especially the gradual spread of retail competition. 
 
I am often asked whether I think that there is an “energy crisis.”  I do not think that 
the “crisis” mentality for identifying and dealing with energy policy issues has served the 
country well.  We have a number of energy policy challenges that are likely to take many 
years to deal with effectively.  These challenges may only be visible to the public when 
there are “crises,” but they do not disappear when the short-term crisis inevitably abates. 
Sound long-term policies that can and are sustained during and between energy market 
shocks are what we should be looking for.  The experience of the last 25 years 
demonstrates that the best energy policies are those that focus on making markets work 
better, mitigating serious market imperfections, pursuing competition policies that 
mitigate market power, and on using flexible market-based mechanisms to internalize 
environmental and national security externalities.  This is the framework that should 
guide long-term energy policies in the future.   
  
TABLE 1 
 
NATURAL GAS SPOT PRICE BASIS DIFFERENCES 
$/MMBTU1 
 
 
 
DATE   Henry Hub  San Juan  So. Cal Border 
 
June 16,2000  $ 4.38   $ 3.90   $ 4.63 
 
July 17      4.18      3.61      4.70 
 
August 15     4.43      3.40      4.63 
 
October 20     5.04      4.48      5.36 
 
November 17     5.88      5.47     10.00 
 
December 15     7.52      6.85     14.00 
 
December 20     9.12      8.55     17.00 
 
January 18, 2001    7.86      7.36     11.50 
 
May 23     4.04      3.47     13.40 
 
June 1      3.77      3.03     10.00   
                                                 
1 Data from Megawatt Daily  (Financial Times) and Energy Market Report (Economic 
Insight, Inc.), various issues 
  
 
TABLE 2 
AVERAGE REVENUE PER KWH 
RESIDENTIAL CONSUMERS2 
(cents/kWh) 
 
STATE   1997   1998 
Connecticut   12.13   11.95 
Maine    12.75   13.02    
Massachusetts   11.59   10.60 
Rhode Island   12.12   10.91 
New Jersey   12.08   11.39 
New York   14.12   13.66 
Pennsylvania     9.90     9.93 
Delaware     9.22     9.13 
 
Illinois    10.43     9.85 
Indiana     6.94     7.01 
Ohio      8.63     8.70 
Wisconsin     6.88     7.17 
Iowa      8.21     8.38 
Kansas        7.71     7.65 
Missouri     7.09     7.08 
North Dakota     6.27     6.49 
 
Florida       8.08     7.89 
Georgia     7.74     7.67 
South Carolina      7.51     7.51 
West Virginia     6.26     6.29 
Kentucky     5.58     5.61 
Alabama     6.74     6.94 
Arkansas     7.80     7.51 
Texas      7.82     7.65 
 
Arizona     8.82     8.68 
California   11.50   10.60 
Montana     6.40     6.50 
New Mexico     8.92     8.85 
Wyoming     6.22     6.28 
Oregon       5.56     5.82 
Washington     4.95     5.03 
 
U.S. Average     8.43     8.26 
                                                 
2 Source:  U.S. Energy Information Administration. Electric Sales and Revenue, 1997 and 1998 editions.   
  
TABLE 3 
AVERAGE REVENUE PER KWH 
INDUSTRIAL CONSUMERS3 
(cents/kWh) 
 
STATE   1997   1998 
Connecticut     7.76     7.70 
Maine      6.36     6.61    
Massachusetts       8.78     8.18 
Rhode Island     8.52     7.61 
New Jersey     8.11     7.94 
New York     5.20     4.95 
Pennsylvania     5.89     5.63 
Delaware     4.82     4.65 
 
Illinois      5.29     5.11 
Indiana     3.91     3.95 
Ohio      4.16     4.30 
Wisconsin     3.72     3.86 
Iowa      3.95     3.99 
Kansas        4.51     4.46 
Missouri     4.46     4.43 
North Dakota     4.38     4.30 
 
Florida       5.04     4.81 
Georgia     4.13     4.23 
South Carolina      4.00     3.69 
West Virginia     3.47     3.78 
Kentucky     2.80     2.91 
Alabama     3.71     3.89 
Arkansas     4.45     4.16 
Texas      4.05     3.94 
 
Arizona     5.05     5.12 
California     6.95     6.59 
Montana     3.66     3.19 
New Mexico     4.42     4.47 
Wyoming     3.46     3.38 
Oregon      3.23     3.50 
Washington     2.59     2.64 
 
U.S. Average     4.53     4.48 
                                                 
3 Source:  U.S. Energy Information Administration. Electric Sales and Revenue, 1997 and 1998 editions.  
See footnote to Table 1A. 
 
  
TABLE 4 
 
COMPREHENSIVE STATE RETAIL COMPETITION PROGRAMS 
(Start Date /All consumers eligible date) 
 
 
1996    1997     1998     1999 
      
California (1998/1998) Massachusetts (3-98/3-98)     Arizona(10-99/1-2001)  New Jersey (11-99/11-99) 
            NH (1998/1998-Delayed) Illinois (10-1999/5-2002)     Connecticut (1-2000/7-2000) Arkansas (1-2002/6-2003) 
NY (1998/2001)  Maine (3-2000/3-2000)          Delaware (10-99/10-2000)  
Pennsylvania (1/99-1-00) Montana (7-98/7-2000)          Maryland (7-2000/7-2002) 
Rhode Island (1-98/1-98)          New Mexico (1-01/1-2002) 
             Ohio (1-2001/12-2005) 
             Oregon (10/01 Except 
 residential) 
             Texas (1-02/1-02) 
             Virginia (1-02/1-04) 
 
Average IOU Electricity Prices (1997): 
 
10.4 cents/kWh  8.3 cents/kWh   9.5 cents/kWh   6.8 cents/kWh 
 
 
Other States:  5.6 cents/Kwh 
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ENERGY PRODUCTION, CONSUMPTION AND IMPORTS 1949-99
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FIGURE 6
U.S. PETROLEUM CONSUMPTION, PRODUCTION AND IMPORTS
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FIGURE 7
REAL FOSSIL FUEL PRODUCTION PRICES
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
19
49
19
51
19
53
19
55
19
57
19
59
19
61
19
63
19
65
19
67
19
69
19
71
19
73
19
75
19
77
19
79
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
$/
M
M
BT
U
REAL CRUDE OIL PRICE ($1996) REAL FOSSIL FUEL COMPOSITE ($1996)
FIGURE 8
Total Energy Consumed per Dollar Real GDP (10Btu/$1996)
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FIGURE 9
Total Energy Consumption per Capita (MMBTU)
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FIGURE 10
REAL PRICE OF REGULAR UNLEADED GASOLINE
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FIGURE 12
MONTHLY OIL AND GAS WELLS DRILLED 1999-2001
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FIGURE 13
U.S. Crude Oil Refining Capacity
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FIGURE 14
Monthly Stocks of Distillate Fuel
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FIGURE 15
Monthly Refiner Price for No. 2 Oil
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FIGURE 16
Natural Gas Consumption,Production and Net Imports
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FIGURE 17
REAL WELLHEAD NATURAL GAS PRICES ($1996)
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FIGURE 18
Monthly Natural Gas Wellhead Prices 1999-2001
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
19
99
20
00
20
01
$/
M
M
B
TU
FIGURE 19
NATURAL GAS UNDERGROUND STORAGE
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FIGURE 20
MONTHLY NATURAL GAS STORAGE (1999-2001)
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FIGURE 22
Electricity From Renewal Energy (Except Hydro)
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FUELS USED TO GENERATE ELECTRICITY 1990
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FIGURE 24
U.S. ELECTRICITY GENERATION
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FIGURE 27
NET ELECTRICITY GENERATION FROM NON-UTILITY GENERATORS
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FIGURE 28
CALIFORNIA PX DAY-AHEAD PRICES
($/Mwh:Weighted Averages 7 x 24)
1998 1999 2000 2001
January - 21.6 31.8 260.2
February - 19.6 18.8 363.0 (ISO)
March - 24.0 29.3 313.5 (ISO)
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May 12.5 24.7 50.4
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FIGURE 29
COAL CONSUMPTION AND PRODUCTION
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FIGURE 30
U.S. Coal Production
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FIGURE 31
NUCLEAR GENERATION
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FIGURE 32
NUCLEAR GENERATING CAPACITY
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Nuclear Plant Capacity Factors
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MOTOR VEHICLE FUEL EFFICIENCY
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FIGURE 35
RENEWABLE ENERGY CONSUMPTION (BILLION BTU)
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ALTERNATIVE FUEL VEHICLES
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